How Starbucks Lost its Social License--And Paid £20 Million to Get it Back

I have a new column in Tax Notes International [gated] today, pdf available here, about Starbucks's £20 million promise to the UK after a firestorm of controversy erupted last year when it was revealed to have paid no taxes despite 14 years of franchise expansion in the country. 

Abstract:

UK Uncut's logo for Starbucks Protests

It is well accepted that corporations require various legal licenses to do business in a state. But Starbucks’ recent promise to pay more tax to the UK regardless of its legal obligation to do so confirms that businesses also need what corporate social responsibility experts call a “social license to operate”. Companies may now in effect be required to pay some indeterminable amount of tax in order to safeguard public approval of their ongoing operations. This suggests that even as the OECD moves forward on a project to salvage the international tax system from its tattered, century-old remains, the tax standards articulated by governments will no longer be enough to guarantee safe passage for multinationals. Instead, companies may have to deal with a much more volatile, and fickle, tax policy regime: one developed on the fly by public opinion.

As always, I welcome comments.

Taxcast on unilateral and multilateral approaches to the problem of base erosion

I contributed to this month's Tackle Tax Haven's podcast, together with the very interesting Krishen Mehta, formerly of PWC and now of Asia Initiatives where he works on tax policy issues. This month's topics included the OECD's report on the base erosion project and what countries can do unilaterally while they are waiting (potentially for a very long time) for multilateral change. Have a listen.

Manal Corwin, now at KPMG, to discuss Reputational Risk Deriving from the Tax Transparency Movement

Fresh out of Treasury, Manal Corwin and some of her new/old colleagues will present a webcast next Tuesday on Tax Transparency and OECD Initiative on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting:

KPMG's Tax Governance Institute will host a webcast that addresses the implications of tax transparency and the potential impact of the OECD initiative on base erosion and profit shifting. Board and audit committee members, CFOs, tax directors and other business professionals interested in attending the program – one in a series of KPMG presentations on this timely topic – can register at: www.taxgovernanceinstitute.com.

The webcast will focus on "the debate over the shift of taxable business income out of the United States and high-tax jurisdictions around the world and into low or no-tax jurisdictions, and the resulting issue of tax base erosion." I'm not sure if debate is the right word there.  Is there a debate about these two phenomena existing as a factual matter? I think no.  Is there a debate about the appropriateness of such shifting and base erosion? I think decidedly yes.

Interestingly, however, KPMG suggests this is a debate about neither the existence nor the appropriateness of profit shifting and base erosion, but rather it is specifically about transparency, namely, the extent to which the public will gain a right to know about the existence and legal sanction of these practices:

The global debate on tax transparency has sparked both public interest and concerns among many companies, and the spotlight will grow brighter in coming weeks as the OECD prepares to deliver its coordinated action plan on base erosion and profit shifting and the European Commission moves forward with announced plans to address issues around tax fairness. With potentially significant changes in future tax obligations and reputational risks at stake, senior executives and board members at multinational companies should find this webcast, and those that will follow, especially useful as they formulate how their organizations should respond to the debate and possible outcomes.

[Emphasis mine.]  This statement is from Brett Weaver, who is described as "tax partner in KPMG's International Corporate Services practice and the firm's partner-in-charge of Tax Transparency" and a member of KPMG's "Tax Transparency Steering Committee," along with Corwin, who is described by KPMG as:

national leader of KPMG's International Corporate Services practice, principal-in-charge of International Tax Policy in the firm's Washington National Tax practice, and former deputy assistant secretary for Tax Policy for International Tax Affairs in the U.S. Treasury Department and U.S. delegate/vice chair to the OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs. 

The other participant on the webcast will be Philip Kermode, "director of the Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union of the European Commission".

It seems very clear to me that the "reputational risk" Weaver identifies is going to be something corporate tax managers and their legal & accounting advisers will be forced to price in going forward. The last paragraph illuminates this:

...the [KPMG] Tax Governance Institute ... provides opportunities for board members, corporate management, stakeholders, government representatives and others to share knowledge regarding the identification, oversight, management, and appropriate disclosure of tax risk.

I think it is safe to attribute the creation of reputational risk (or what some might call an internalizing of a cost that heretofore has been externalized thanks to strong corporate tax confidentiality laws), as well as any potential that may currently exist for systemic change to occur in the OECD's approach to the taxation of multinationals, to the international tax activist movement. As a result this should be a very informative webcast.

Apple's simple design interface most certainly does not extend to its tax department.

Lee Sheppard has an article today on Apple's tax tricks [gated] where she works through Apple's multinational structure & planning detailes as outlined in the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) report. You should read the whole article, but here are some of its key concepts:

We're ... not easily shocked by transfer pricing practices that the U.S. government accepts, for better or worse. ...But Apple's planning ... is a special case . We're talking gross worldwide revenues the size of the California state budget, and no tax being paid anywhere on a huge chunk of profits. What is truly surprising about the Apple case is its brazenness. PSI concluded that Apple's self-serving intercompany contracts had no effect on its business practices.

...Nearly two-thirds of Apple's revenue comes from foreign sales. According to the PSI report, this foreign income is routed through Ireland and may be taxed nowhere, not even in Ireland. ... 

Apple Operations International (AOI), Apple's Irish-registered holding company, acts as an internal finance company. ... AOI claims tax residence nowhere.

Apple Sales International (ASI), an Irish principal company that manages Apple's supply chain and sales to Europe and Asia, is a subsidiary of Apple Operations Europe (AOE), which is a subsidiary of AOI and has employees and operations. ASI has 250 employees and deals with Apple's third-party Chinese manufacturers. 

ASI claims no tax residence anywhere ... [emphases added].

When I heard these statements--more than once--in the hearings, I wondered why on earth the Senator who was asking at the questions at the time didn't stop right there and say hold on, are you telling us that these companies exist, we are supposed to treat each as a separate taxpayer and respect its independence from the parent company for tax purposes, and accept at the same time that each resides for tax purposes in no country anywhere?

Let's be clear: humans never get away with these kinds of arguments. You might be resident in many places but I think it is very hard to claim that you are resident nowhere--governments always seem to find some reason and some way to claim you. But somehow the Senator didn't challenge this troubling statement.

If the challenge had come, we might have heard a not-so-simple design explanation from Apple, such as that the subsidiaries are incorporated in Ireland, which would make them Irish residents for US tax purposes, but for Irish tax purposes each is resident in Bermuda, while for Bermuda purposes each is resident in Ireland or at least not resident in Bermuda; either way, certainly neither is resident in the United States even though both are clearly controlled from California.

Simple, clean, one button design interface Apple's corporate structure is not.  Funny how Steve Jobs' vision was, and now Tim Cook's vision is, so different for the tax department. Yet this basic structure is, I must hasten to repeat, perfectly, unequivocally legal, understood and accepted and in many ways even facilitated by governments all over the world including and perhaps especially the United States with its deferral regime.  But that doesn't mean the whole structure is similarly straightforward from a legal compliance perspective. More from Lee:

Apple conducts all of its research and development in the United States. Apple Inc., the U.S. parent, has a cost-sharing agreement with AOE and ASI, which pay 60 percent of the cost of this research. Apple's intellectual property is in the United States with the U.S. parent, Apple Inc. Apple told PSI that it divides R&D costs according to worldwide sales revenues.

This arrangement, Lee tells us, dates back to a more permissive time in cost sharing regulatory history and would probably be protected from today's more stringent requirements. Lee observes:

...AOI has no employees; its American board members, who are Apple executives, hold their meetings in California, often without the participation of the lone Irish director. Apple's tax director told PSI that he believed AOI is not managed and controlled in Ireland. Apple told PSI that AOI has not paid income tax to any government for the past five years.

...Ireland takes the position that it is a legitimate low-tax country that only permits the 12.5 percent rate for income from trade, an ancient English concept that appears to require a ruling. Yet Apple told PSI that Ireland permitted an income calculation that enabled Apple subsidiaries to pay Irish corporate income tax at a rate of 2 percent or less. 

Lee wonders if this puts Ireland in a troublesome place vis a vis EU law which prohibits burying state aid within generally applicable tax laws, especially since Ireland is already getting some heat for changing its laws "to accommodate the numerous U.S. multinationals that use it to shelter European sales income." She then works through US domestic tax law and the US-Ireland treaty to show that AOI could very well be viewed as being taxable in the US, yet its income probably wouldn't be subject to tax in any event given the rather complex, internally inconsistent, but overall taxpayer friendly rules of subpart F and its ancillaries.

All in all Lee runs through of some of the more arcane complexities of the US international tax rules in this article, and makes a pretty persuasive case for viewing the system as hopelessly absurd in the extreme.  Tim Cook says he wants to change that, that he's all for a simpler, cleaner interface for the tax code. But remember that very often when someone says they want simplicity, what they really just want is to be able to pay (even) less tax.

Corporate tax transparency: Australia's work in progress

Australia is working on transparency and information sharing, and is seeking feedback by April 24 (this Wednesday):

On 4 February 2013, the Assistant Treasurer announced the Government’s intention to improve the transparency of Australia’s business tax system and that the Government would consider the views of the community in assessing what changes are appropriate. 

The Government seeks your feedback and comments on the issues outlined in this discussion paper. As this paper provides details about how these proposals could be legislated, you may wish to comment on law design as well as policy design issues in your submission. It would assist the consultation process if those stakeholders who have any concerns with the proposals could provide practical examples in their submissions demonstrating the implications of these proposals and how any alternative approaches could operate.

Highlights from the discussion paper:

On 4 February 2013, the Assistant Treasurer announced the Government’s intention to improve the transparency of Australia’s business tax system with a view to introducing necessary legislation later this year. ... 

This paper outlines three proposals that could give effect to this announcement. ...These proposals could complement existing corporate disclosure requirements and enhance the administration and regulation of Australia’s tax system and capital markets. ...

• Transparency of tax payable by large and multinational businesses. 

– The objective of this proposal is to enable the public to better understand the corporate tax system and engage in tax policy debates, as well as to discourage aggressive tax minimisation practices by large corporate entities. 

• Publishing aggregate collections for each Commonwealth tax. 

– The objective of this proposal is to enable better public disclosure of aggregate tax revenue collections, even when the identity of particular entities could potentially be deduced. 

• Enhanced information sharing between Government agencies. 

– The objective of this proposal is to build on existing information sharing arrangements and enable greater information sharing between the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) and the Department of the Treasury with respect to foreign acquisition and investment decisions affecting Australia.

Australia's Treasury seeks to consider views from "the community"--not defined so no reason that can't mean the global community.  Address written submissions to: 

General Manager
Tax System Division
The Treasury
Langton Crescent
PARKES ACT 2600

TaxTransparency@treasury.gov.au

Thanks to Miranda Stewart for passing this along.

US to OECD: target your anti-BEPS regime carefully

This is rich. The US wants the OECD to not go overboard on the BEPS thing.  From Tax Analysts [gated], Treasury International Tax Counsel Danielle Rolfes said that the Treasury wants to

"make sure that any suggested solutions are targeted at addressing the source of the problems and don't go beyond the scope of the BEPS project."

We are talking about a country that can't seem to distinguish between an au pair financing a trip to Europe and a billionaire stashing money in a series of hidden offshore accounts. Yet there's more:

...The BEPS project carries a risk of "scope creep," Rolfes said. ... "We want to stay mindful of what BEPS is and make sure that in trying to solve those problems we don't come up with solutions that are broader than necessary or that have other implications, particularly with respect to the allocation of taxing rights between two taxing jurisdictions," she said.

...While Treasury endorses the sense of urgency around the BEPS project and the feeling that the problems must be fixed, Rolfes said that U.S. officials intend to be thoughtful about how the rules should or should not be changed.  

I'm not sure what is meant by being thoughtful. Being thoughtful might mean thinking through what you need to change, how you mean to change it, how you avoid over-breadth and under-breadth at the same time, how much everyone has to spend in order to get the result you seek, and whether what you write as rules can be coherently implemented in practice.

Perhaps Rolfes is worried that if the OECD looks too closely at the allocation of taxing rights between two taxing jurisdictions, the world will see clearly that (1) the US is the most overreaching in this respect given that it taxes on the basis of citizenship and (2) the global North has long arranged the allocation to favor itself at the expense of the global South.  

Maybe it is just that Rolfes does not appreciate the finger pointing at US companies:

"It's not just U.S. companies that engage in BEPS. Moreover, all agree that the BEPS we are primarily concerned with is driven by tax planning that is perfectly legal."

Rolfes called some of the moralizing on this issue "ironic," though I think she means "hypocritical." It might not not sound right for the Treasury to use that word when talking about tax competition, so maybe this is carefully chosen rhetoric:

Rolfes [added]that while much of BEPS income lands in zero-tax jurisdictions, some of the elements of tax laws that enable BEPS are attributable to tax competition that's occurring between the same taxing jurisdictions that are trying to solve BEPS.

"This tax competition itself contributes to BEPS," she said.

She acknowledges that "many of the current international standards, such as those relating to transfer pricing and tax treaties, have been developed over many years by U.S. tax policymakers working with their counterparts in the OECD."  She says "We at Treasury are humbled ...And we want to make sure that any solutions we have are targeted to that problem and not to other problems."

Treasury economist Michael McDonald added that

The BEPS project should clearly undertake a cost-benefit analysis of the possible alternatives...clearly I think if the BEPS project is going to be successful, one has to weigh the benefits of the current [OECD] Transfer Pricing Guidelines, in addition to the costs."

Tax Analysts economist Martin A. Sullivan can't understand why the US is focused on the BEPS thing at all, since Dave Camp has a proposal for switching the U.S. to a territorial system:

"To me, that seems much more important than an OECD initiative. I don't understand how the two are going to work together. If Chairman Camp achieves his goal by the end of the year of putting the entire international tax system up for a vote, shouldn't that be our starting point?"

Rolfes responded that the BEPS project would still matter even if the US changed to territorial, since such a switch would not in any way make profit shifting less an issue. She also had some interesting things to say about participation and influence in tax policymaking via the OECD:

Treasury needs to be engaged in a significant tax policy initiative like BEPS, which would be undertaken by other countries with or without the U.S. ...Having a seat at the OECD table provides the United States the opportunity to be a part of the dialogue and to have an influence on how international tax rules are developed ... [and] other countries are not going to wait for the conclusion of the U.S. Congress's reform debate.

So the US sees the OECD as playing an important role, and one that could have negative impacts on US policymaking choices absent Treasury's involvement. And this exchange shows that at least some at the Treasury are capable of articulating at least a sense of understanding the concept of regulatory overbreadth. But you could interpret these statements as at best tepid support for the OECD's initiative, at worst a foreshadowing of resistance to come. The US torpedoed the OECD's efforts on harmful tax practices, only to come up with the much more expansive and awe-inspiring FATCA on its own. If the US torpedoes BEPS, what will be in store for the taxation of multinationals? It should be a fascinating ride.

How to Make America a Global Tax Haven

Isn't it astonishing that at the very moment the USA is twisting arms the world over ostensibly to crack down on tax havens and the erosion of the tax base they help perpetuate, Bloomberg could run this headline without irony or shame, and we can get a brand new quote from yet another American lawmaker about the virtues of making the US a tax haven. This time it's not Paul Ryan who wants to "make America a tax shelter" but his friend Devin Nunes, who says the US ought to abandon corporate income tax, and substitute for it a cash flow consumption tax, in order to "make the U.S. the largest tax haven in human history."

You just cannot make these things up. You remember Nunes, I hope--yes, that's him, the co-chair of the international working group on tax reform convened by Camp & Levin. Yes, that Levin, the one that wrote FATCA, the legislation that is supposed to stop Americans from cheating on their taxes by using other countries as tax havens.

Of course you can say that in substance the two are very different--Levin's focus is to stop Americans hiding cash overseas in foreign bank accounts, while Nunes just wants to let corporations pay less tax on the income they earn in the US. And a cash flow consumption tax might not be evil. But using the tax haven and tax shelter rhetoric as a marketing strategy is objectionable. Either you think tax havens and tax shelters are an abuse of the rule of law, in which case you shouldn't try to turn your country into one, or you think they're just dandy in which case you shouldn't try to shut everyone other country down  to capture the market for yourself.

Rosenbloom on proven incentives to get offshore cash back home

David Rosenbloom has a great letter to the editor in Tax Notes today [gated], excerpts:

Recent press reports describe a large increase in January tax receipts as taxpayers shifted substantial amounts of income forward into 2012 in order to avoid the higher taxes anticipated for 2013. 

...We have been told, again and again, that there must be lower tax rates on accumulated foreign earnings in order to provide an appropriate incentive for U.S. multinational companies to repatriate the enormous sums they hold offshore.  

...It turns out that incentives can be created just as well by raising taxes as by lowering them. 

Who knew?

Nice. Empirical evidence that to get cash repatriated, the trick is to raise taxes with enough lead time for companies to move thing around. Best part: this process is totally repeatable next year.

Public disclosure of global corporate tax info, coming soon in the US?

I was happy to see a rather lengthy discussion in Tax Analysts[gated] a little while ago, authored by Randall Jackson on the emerging US corporate tax transparency rules. These rules derive from a global movement to counter corruption, called the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The US rules were enacted as a hasty and rather stealthy last-minute addendum to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010, and have yet to be implemented, in part because of intense industry pressure. That pressure continues, especially from the American Petroleum Institute, even though that organization expresses support for EITI in principle. Jackson describes how the disclosure rules came about under Dodd-Frank, and what information is set to be disclosed when the first US companies begin making their disclosures thereunder (February 2014 at the earliest):

Dodd-Frank section 1504 amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by adding a new section 13(q), "Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers," which requires country-by-country (and project-by-project) reporting of all payments, including taxes, made to all foreign governments and the U.S. federal government. (Analysis of Dodd-Frank .) 

The legislation requires companies engaged in the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals that file a yearly report with the SEC to file an additional detailed annual report (new Form SD, which is separate from countries' 10-K annual report) listing all their payments, including taxes, fees (including license fees), royalties, production entitlements, bonuses, dividends, and payments for infrastructure improvements. Payments of at least $100,000 during the most recent fiscal year must be listed.

...Reports must be detailed and specific, listing payments to each foreign government, foreign subnational government, and the U.S. federal government. (Payments to subnational U.S. governments, such as state governments, need not be reported.) The reports will be publicly available online. 

More specifically, the reports must separately list each project and the types and totals of payments made in connection with each project; the types and totals of amounts paid to each government, including a separate list of the governments that received payments; the total payments by category; the currency in which the payments were made; the relevant financial period; and the business segment of the company that made the payment.

Jackson discusses the origin of the inclusion of the EITI addendum in Dodd-Frank (by means of an amendment by Senators Cardin & Lugar, whose prior attempt to pass EITI as a stand alone bill failed in 2009) and the subsequent industry pressure in some amount of detail. He includes a description of API's attempt to unwind the legislation via a legal challenge. API is arguing that the SEC failed to undertake a sufficient cost/benefit analysis of the rules, failed to study how the rules and costs would impact US companies doing business in other countries, and failed to create exemptions in cases where foreign law would prohibit the required disclosure. Jackson quotes the complaint: "the Commission did not even bother to determine how many countries had laws on the books prohibiting disclosure." He also quotes the SE's response:

[T]he SEC wrote that it had rejected commentators' suggestions to exempt firms operating in countries where the required disclosure is prohibited because the agency is skeptical that such prohibitions actually exist, and allowing exemptions would violate the spirit of the law. Furthermore, it said that allowing that kind of exemption could encourage foreign countries to pass anti-transparency laws or to interpret existing laws in a harsher fashion.

To which Cardin and Lugar responded:

"API wants to push us back to a time when the U.S. had few tools to add accountability and stability to the inherently unstable energy sector," Cardin said. "Congress and the SEC carefully crafted a reasonable and very manageable reporting requirement that will bring greater transparency to the oil, gas, and mineral sectors." 

"The U.S. economy and our values substantially benefit when our companies are working in oil-, gas-, and mineral-rich states," Lugar added. "But the benefits will not be realized if investments serve to entrench authoritarianism, corruption, and instability. With oil prices high and volatile, our economy needs more transparent markets, not less.

Cardin and Lugar, along with Senator Levin, have submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of the SEC, which Jackson quotes:

"Resource companies can believe whatever they wish and make any communication they wish about their payments to foreign governments, 'the resource curse,' or the benefits or costs of transparency; they have done so throughout this process. What resource companies may not do is impede the power of the legislative branch to require disclosure of objective information to fulfill compelling public policy objectives, including the strengthening of American national and energy security and investor protection."

It remains to be seen whether industry will be successful in pushing back the EITI regime; if not, we should start seeing the additional disclosure I believe by September of this year. So here is a question. How many multinational extractive industry companies are there in the world, and how many will be covered by the US EITI regime? In other words, if and when the US rules are in place, how many extractive industry companies will not have their information revealed through these disclosure rules by virtue of affiliation with US companies? Is it a few, many, or most? If anyone knows whether this is known or could be ascertained, I'd like to know.

Who is to blame for Starbucks-style tax dodging?

The answer is "government" if you believe the Telegraph, from an opinion by "Richard Emerton, Head of Board Practice at Korn/Ferry Whitehead Mann" (an executive recruiting firm). He's enthusiastic about tax competition: the kind that will keep European companies "competitive" on a "level playing field" by lowering their taxes on purpose, and he's keen to blame government alone for any failure of tax policy to date, e.g. the kind of failure that led to the public shaming of Starbucks and friends.

I agree with Emerton when he says stop blaming the companies (alone) for failing to pay taxes when this is the system that has been deliberately set up to meet them. But let us not forget that the rules have long been written collaboratively amongst government and business interests with virtually no civil society oversight. Once again, multinationals have the best tax system money can buy. Emerton does forget to mention that part, and goes too far in shifting the blame to government alone. Excerpts:

...The UK Government has done a good job in creating a tax system that encourages businesses to set up in Britain and the Chancellor has made it clear he wants international businesses to operate here. It is therefore important he does all he can to prevent European politics from perverting his well-intentioned efforts to look at the problem from an international perspective.  

What strikes me as counter-productive about the debates that have taken place over the likes of Starbucks and Google is the anti-business rhetoric from many politicians in the search for public approval. A degree of anger from the public may be understandable, but is it directed at the right targets? Korn/Ferry’s latest “Boardroom Pulse” survey of FTSE 100 chairmen suggests that business leaders think not.

Not sure what that survey asked, but let's assume it was something on the order of, "do you enjoy being publicly pilloried for doing your best to exploit every means of tax reduction your government generously makes available to you?" And the follow up question ought to have been (but probably was not) "Do you enjoy public scrutiny of your constant attempts to influence tax policy at every level of governance in order to achieve that generosity of spirit on the part of lawmakers?" To which the answer would no doubt have likewise been a resounding "business leaders think not." Emerton goes on:

While agreeing that the public has a right to be angry, many respondents felt that dissatisfaction should be directed towards the tax legislation and those in charge of it, rather than the companies observing it.Indeed, it is governments that have failed to modernise international tax legislation in decades, despite the wholesale changes that have taken place in the way businesses operate across borders. 

Oh, but Mr. Emerton, you failed to define a key term here: "those in charge of it." I mean, it's not like the companies that help write the law are shy about it. That is, after all, what organizations like the BIAC and the ICC are for, and if you don't know what the BIAC or ICC are, well, you're not trying hard enough to understand international tax. Look also for example at any number of marketing brochures by the likes of the big four. They are not hiding their influence, they are selling it as a product. Here's one by KPMG that I just happened to come across yesterday:

Our professionals have been directly involved in writing and reviewing the applicable Treasury regulations ... which govern tax-free separations."

You will come across this kind of claim all the time if you do any work at all in tax, so it is disingenuous at best to fail to mention industry influence as a major aspect of tax lawmaking at the national and international levels. But Mr. Emerton moves along quickly to make hay of the old adage that every one has a right to minimize their taxes and for company directors this has become a duty:

The chairmen we surveyed pointed out that company directors have a fiduciary duty to minimise tax bills, providing they are acting in an ethical manner and are not inviting legal risks.

That's a pretty vague provided, and a big weight to carry for fiduciary law. Emerton hammers it home:

Which raises a fundamental question stemming from the tax issue – should the primary duty of a company’s board and senior management be to its shareholders, or to the wider moral and social concerns of the public?

Notice this is assumed to be an either/or and not a both, and it's also committing the false dilemma fallacy. But having committed, we must have follow-through:

The chairmen we talked to were divided. Yes, business leaders have a duty to drive value for their shareholders. And yes, businesses also have a duty to act responsibly as members of wider society. It is the responsibility of the leaders of these businesses to strike a balance and most of them make significant efforts to do so. Inevitably, sometimes they get this balance wrong, but attacking them for trying to drive shareholder value while playing by the rules of the game will solve little. A better focus of our energies is to ensure that international tax laws are strengthened by the regulatory framework governing businesses, allowing them to focus on achieving long-term sustainable value for shareholders and for society. However, policymakers must ensure that this isn’t achieved at the expense of a level playing field for businesses across the world, not just one part of it.

The author channels every "we paid all the tax that is legally due" defense ever given in the face of public pressure against tax dodging. He also invokes the "level playing field" metaphor, which is always invoked for every destructive tax policy that was ever invented in response to every other destructive tax policy that was ever invented. So three cheers for tax industry rhetoric, bandied about in any tax policy dialogue to make sure no one thinks too hard about the systemic choices at issue here.

Score ten points to Mr. Emerton in pointing out that blame for tax dodging rests in a legal system that has been specifically designed to encourage it. But take away nine points for failing to mention the big part business plays in constantly perpetuating that kind of design. Then take away two more points for failing to mention that some things only look like dutiful tax minimization until the tax authority figures out what you are doing, and then they are clearly tax evasion. Cf Dow, Ernst & Young, and Jenkins & Gilchrist tax partners, and that's all in just one week.

That puts the column in the negative territory, which is right about where the author appears to think that the tax liabilities of fiduciary-duty-abiding corporate managers ought to keep their companies' tax burdens.

Protesters Confront "Fix the Debt" Leader over Corporate Tax Breaks

And they do it with a big sign:

The protestors are calling themselves "Flip the Debt."  From truth-out:

While speaking at a Fix the Debt conference on Monday, Honeywell International Inc. CEO David Cote [he of "union busting for dummies" fame] was interrupted several times by Flip the Debt protesters over tax loopholes that allow companies like Honeywell and General Electric to pay far less taxes than ordinary Americans. 

Three minutes into Cote's keynote address, the first heckler trumpeted: 

...Fix the Debt is nothing more than a CEO lobby whose real objective is huge corporate tax breaks and drastic cuts in Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid. David Cote and his CEO friends receive a lot from government: In 2011, Honeywell received $725 million in government deals, making it the 35th largest federal contractor. However, Honeywell and other companies pay next to nothing in taxes. Honeywell's tax rate from 2008-2011 was 2 percent. Does anyone in this room pay 2 percent?"

 The crowd applauded, but Cote only laughed nervously.

So, he neither confirmed nor denied whether he paid 2%.  An interesting nod to the UK, similar to the spread of the "Uncut" movement across the atlantic:

Gan Golan, cofounder of Flip the Debt, laid out his group's goals. "We will disrupt Fix the Debt meetings across the country to elevate our message that the biggest corporations in the country aren't paying taxes, and now they want the rest of us to pay for it. Sustained public pressure against corporate tax dodgers in the UK has put the issue at the top of the agenda there, and we hope to do the same."

The article mentions the Sanders bill to end deferral, and ends on the connection between tax dodging by multinationals and the dismantling of the welfare state:

Charlie Balban, president of the Alliance for Retired Americans-New Hampshire, grilled Cote during a question-and-answer period. "We should do something about the debt, but we don't need to cut programs that people depend on. Instead of reducing the deficit on the backs of working Americans, corporations should pay taxes like the rest of us."

It can't be too much longer before someone draws up a menu of welfare state expenditures in the US and then ties each item to a specific company and what they might have paid in taxes had they incurred the statutory rate on their income for the year.  If you see such a thing, please send me a link.

International tax as revealed in SEC filings

I've written before about how opaque international taxation is because most of the law is worked out in ways that are not made visible to the public, namely through non-judicial review of transfer pricing and related disputes among nations.  I've argued for both corporate tax disclosure and publication of competent authority agreements as a remedy to much of this opacity. Tax Analysts' Transfer Pricing Roundup [gated] offers a fascinating window onto this world:

Transfer Pricing Roundup summarizes significant tax disputes that publicly listed firms have disclosed to regulatory authorities. The regular monitoring of these disclosures sheds light on the friction points within the U.S. system of transfer pricing enforcement. Many of the disputes profiled here involve adjustments resulting from controversial cost-sharing arrangements.

Some of the highlights:

• Accenture PLC, a global management consulting, technology services, and outsourcing company, reported its unrecognized tax benefits could decrease by $637k or increase by $208k depending on how things go with some settlements, lapses of statutes of limitations [read: if they were going to catch us with our fingers in a cooky jar, it's about to be too late] and other adjustments relating mostly to transfer pricing matters 
• Amazon is disputing transfer pricing adjustments in the US that would result in additional tax of $1.5 billion, and in France to the tune of $250 million. 
• Amazon also recorded reserves for tax contingencies of $336M for 2012 and $266M for 2011, to cover transfer pricing, state income tax, and research and development credit positions.
• Cooper Cos. Inc., a medical device company, has $29.5M in "unrecognized tax benefit," $5M of which relate to transfer pricing and other issues "that could significantly change in the next 12 months because of expiring statutes [see above] in unnamed jurisdictions." 
• Dell continues an ongoing battle with the IRS over transfer pricing adjustments dating back to 2004-2006. Dell reports that "An unfavorable outcome in this matter could have a material effect on the company's operations, financial position, and cash flows."
• Microsoft is also involved in a protracted battle with the IRS over transfer pricing involving 2004 to 2006, which could have a "significant impact" on the company's financial statements if it is not resolved in Microsoft's favor. Microsoft does not expect resolution any time soon: must be some thorny issue to work out there. Microsoft's tax contingencies and liabilities are huge: $7.7B and $7.6B as of December 31, 2012, and June 30, 2012, respectively.

Much, much more at the link. Most of these are pharma and software companies--i.e., lots of IP that has been moved offshore and is busy stripping income out of high-tax countries with variations on the dutch sandwich, which looks a little something like this:

Now with Less Fiber!

My feeling is that it is a real shame that most or all of these cases will get settled and eventually quietly erased from balance sheets with little or no explanation and therefore no advancement in the development of international tax law whatsoever, despite all of the resources that will have been sunk into the cause by the private sector and government alike. What a shame.

Starbucks' £20m pledge is not a tax, but likely is a tax benefit

I've mentioned here and there that Starbucks' decision to pledge £20m to the UK as penance to the public for its extremely effective tax planning over the past fifteen years is not a tax but might be and probably is a tax benefit, and I've been asked to explain why that is, and why it matters.

First, lets define what a tax is. A tax is a compulsory extraction of resources undertaken by a government, for which failure to comply results in threat of penalty.  A government can do this because it monopolizes the use of force. A tax can be fair or unfair, regressive, progressive, good, bad, or ugly. Not every forceful extraction of resources is a tax per se, but every tax is certainly a forceful extraction of resources. Governments can be (and are) lax, selective, even grossly unjust, in enforcing stated penalties, but so long as the threat exists, an extraction is a tax. No threat of penalty for nonpayment, no tax.

Now let's look at three reasons why Starbucks' £20m pledge cannot possibly be a tax.

1. It is not being imposed by a government.  Despite the BBC calling this an "agreement," Starbucks itself has characterized the 20m as the product of its own internal decision-making processes. Sure, it's responding to public pressure, but that's not government extraction.
2. It is not compulsory. After David Cameron piled on at Davos, Starbucks hinted that it might change its mind about its pledge, maybe not be quite so generous if the government won't even bother to be decently grateful about its magnanimity. Who's to stop that? Not HMRC.
3. There is no penalty if Starbucks doesn't actually hand over the money. At least, not by government; the court of public opinion might be a different story, depends on the news cycle I suppose. But having failed to levy taxes, HMRC can hardly argue if the 20m doesn't show up at some point.

One happy result is that at least Starbucks will not be able to immediately claim the 20m as a credit against taxes it owes at home in the USA (not a tax, let alone one on income, so no foreign tax credit). But what can we say then of the 20m? If it is not a tax, what is it?

The answer is, it is a charitable contribution to the UK government. Why, you may say, that would imply that it's deductible! Yes, depending on the UK's rules for deductibility of contributions to the government. I suspect it would be deductible (UK readers, correct me if I am wrong). Certainly in the US a similar pledge would be deductible under s170:

[T]he term "charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the use of— 

(1) A State, a possession of the United States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or the United States or the District of Columbia, but only if the contribution or gift is made for exclusively public purposes. 

Notice: no need for it to be out of generosity, just need a contribution for exclusively public purposes. Not, say, lobbying, outings for lawmakers, bribery, kickbacks, collusion, etc. But I digress.

Keep in mind that the whole point here is that Starbucks has no income in the UK against which to take any deduction, should it be available...at least, right now. But if the UK rules for NOLs are anything like those in the US, they can hold that £20m on the books for years, maybe even a couple of decades and deduct it later, if and when they ever do have positive income being booked in the UK (maybe subject to some limitations, as in the US).

 So, it's not a tax, but if Starbucks in fact turns it over it will be a tax benefit, tucked away somewhere in some regulatory filing in extreme fine print, to be used at some future date to--wait for it---reduce the company's tax bill.

Neat trick!

Corporate tax: why disclosure is the key to reform

Two columns of interest emerged today on the issue of corporate tax disclosure, plus another interesting public hearing in the UK, this time with the big four in the hot seat.  Put all of this together and we can see very clearly the intense connection between tax reform and public understanding of the status quo.  With the latter as to corporate tax being woefully inadequate and relevant information intentionally hidden from public view, the former can be neither informed nor meaningful.  The answer is corporate tax transparency, particularly for multinationals, i.e., on the order of country-by-country reporting for listed companies.  First, on the columns, both from the FT.

In this one, John Gapper says "Companies are complying with laws that governments could change if they wished," and then explains:

Starbucks’ supposed immoral act is not to pay UK corporation tax that it does not owe, and would not owe even if it did not license its brand from the Netherlands. It obeys both the letter and the spirit of global tax law, which governments could reform if they wished.

That's 100% correct. And if you think there is some "spirit" in the transfer pricing law that isn't being acknowledged, then you are forgetting that the transfer pricing rules were effectively written by the industry they are meant to police. So I think the spirit is pretty much being well given its due. Gapper also nicely illustrates what I call the mercenary tendency of the tax state in an economically integrated world: agree with whatever seems politically expedient in principle, defect in practice:

I look forward to Mr Cameron naming and shaming companies such as Google (also a target of British politicians) if they are drawn from Ireland to the UK by his tax arbitrage. 

...Governments must decide which regime is fair, and companies and individuals must comply. 

... most companies that place operations or intellectual property in low-tax countries – or even in tax havens such as Bermuda – are not breaching the spirit of global tax law. They comply with a structure established under the League of Nations in the 1920s. 

This allows – indeed, encourages – multinationals to split their operations among countries, paying taxes as if they were separate entities, in order to avoid double taxation. They have to make transactions at “arm’s length” – as they would deal with others. 

It worked for a long time but is under strain because of the growing value of brands, intellectual property and intangibles to global corporations. “Ideas are their biggest asset, and what generate profits, and it is far easier to shift intangibles than factories,” says Jeffrey Owens, of the Institute for Austrian and International Tax Law.

Well, this is mostly right, at least close enough for its purposes. However, I am just not sure what principles we should expect to emerge when reporters turn, as they too often do, to Mr. Owens, former director of the OECD's tax arm and the man who presided over the demise of the corporate tax on a global scale under the nurturing constancy of the OECD's business-driven tax policy making machine, a person moreover who has publicly called for governments to "avoid like hell" any taxes on corporations. He would seem to be the last person you would ask about how to make a corporate tax system function, again, unless we are talking about that movie.  Gapper concludes:

Politicians thus have the choice of indulging in easy rhetoric against companies that obey the laws they have passed or struggling to reform the tax regime for little reward, with lots of disruption. In their position, I might posture too.

If that's not an argument for greater public accountability of how transfer pricing works out in practice, I am not sure what is.

That brings me to the second column of the day from the FT which illustrates why the public ought to know more about how these regimes work in practice, this one by Bruce Bartlett in which he asks, can publicity curb corporate tax avoidance? He lays out the case nicely for the runaway corporate tax base and he concludes:

[L]ittle in the way of real economic activity, such as jobs or tangible investment, has shifted anywhere. All that has shifted is the tax base. 

...This makes the international tax regime a ripe target for reformers.

... With reports of low domestic taxes paid by large profitable corporations such as Starbucks in the UK, the time may also be ripe for an international agreement to curb tax shifting. The US has recently implemented a law called the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative that requires companies to disclose their payments to governments from oil, gas and mining assets. Allison Christians of McGill University argues that the expansion of such information reporting to the transfer pricing of all multinationals is the first step towards capturing the revenue now lost to the shifting of business costs to high-tax jurisdictions and revenues to low-tax jurisdictions. 

There is growing evidence that corporations are sensitive to the public outcry when they are caught avoiding taxation excessively. Starbucks, for example, recently agreed to pay more taxes in the UK than legally required to quell the controversy over its virtually nonexistent tax bill. The same shaming technique may have broader application to multinationals generally. 

As Justice Louis Brandeis of the US Supreme Court once put it, “publicity is justly recommended as the remedy for social and industrial diseases”.

First, thank you for the shout out, Mr. Bartlett! Second, this column demonstrates clearly the strong connection between tax reform and public understanding of the status quo, as I suggested above.  Tax reform is not going to come from the only party that has all the info it needs right now, namely, the IRS. Tax reform comes from public expression.  Right now, observers of tax policy need more information in order to offer meaningful reform proposals, and that information is being hidden because governments do not require it to be disclosed, plain and simple.  That is a matter of regulatory choice, and these columns show the choice is bad for policy analysis.

That then brings us to the UK's hearings today in which the public accounts committee taking on the big four accounting firms, trying to suss out what the letter and the spirit of the law is with respect to corporate tax on multinationals.  What emerges is the "perfectly legal" nature of all of this tax avoidance, again confirming the editorials by Gapper and Bartlett.  Here is the BBC's take on the hearings, worth reading in full.  Richard Murphy declares it a win for the PAC but the question is whether that translates to a win for those who do in fact pay taxes in the UK and elsewhere.

That question will be answered affirmatively if instead of killing EITI, which is currently apparently a high priority for many, we expand it to cover all listed companies.

Starbucks to UK: Kneel before Zod!

When it comes to tax, we know by now that Starbucks only giveth when it wants. That means of course that Starbucks can taketh away.  After David Cameron made some remarks about companies smelling the coffee, Starbucks feels bullied and makes noises about maybe not being quite so generous.

Aw, poor Starbucks! Oh, but don't worry, because when you're Starbucks, you just demand a meeting to set things straight:

Kris Engskov, the multinational’s UK managing director, demanded talks at Downing Street after the Prime Minister said tax-avoiding companies had to “wake up and smell the coffee”.

...“The PM is singling the business out for cheap shots, a company that, it should not be forgotten, has pledged to pay tax now and into the future,” said a source close to the firm.

Can we possibly descend into anything more absurd than this ridiculous status quo?  Well sure, of course we can!

The warning on investment comes amid concern among businesses that Government rhetoric on tax avoidance is hurting their image while their creation of jobs and wealth is not highlighted. 

You see, it is the government's job to produce the proper kind of propaganda on these things.  In sum, what we are now being told by multinationals is:

1. We will pay tribute when and where and in the amount we wish to, according to the will of our PR department and no one else.
2. Those upon whom we graciously bestow tribute must grovel in thankfulness and describe us favorably, or we will soon regret our generosity.

Manx tax strategy

Interesting: Isle of Man announces it will keep its 0/10 corporate tax rate and pretty much the rest of its tax system as is, but wil cooperate with the US on FATCA and the EU on its codes of conduct, and might join the mutual administrative assistance in tax matters agreement, and even "consider working with other countries and multilateral organisations on the development of co-operation systems similar to FATCA." I think that last one is in regards to the UK, but it could be broader in scope.

At the same time, the Isle of Man will

"maintain competitive  personal income tax rates  as one of the features making the Island an attractive place to live and work; and

maintain a competitive business tax system in the Isle of Man to support economic development;"

among other aspirations. I think they are in a tough spot, with the US and the UK focused on chasing individual tax cheats and corporate tax avoiders (respectively, perhaps) through their banks. By way of background, the tax strategy says:

The Isle of Man‟s taxation policies have played an important part in our economic success. 

...The key principles of fiscal sovereignty, economic stability and adherence to international standards which underpinned the original taxation strategy remain just as relevant today. 

I'm not sure what anyone means by fiscal sovereignty anymore. Then again, I never really did think it was a real thing.

Avoid Paying Taxes The Warren Buffett Way

The Buffet rule, read it and weep edition:

[One] reason why we hold Berkshire is because of Buffett's uncanny ability to mitigate Berkshire's tax expenses, particularly Berkshire's cash tax payments. We are aware that this is not to be talked about in polite company especially because Buffett has been pounding the table for higher statutory tax rates. … 

We think that Warren Buffett said it best when he said if you can eliminate the government as a (39.6%-46%) business partner, the business will be far more valuable.

How about just eliminating government all together?  How will Berkshire do in the state of nature, do we think. Would roaming marauder business partners cost less?

Picciotto: States can and should switch to unitary corporate tax

Professor Sol Picciotto has a guest post over at TJN today, in which he talks about the viability of unitary taxation for multinationals and why detractors are too pessimistic because they are too wrapped up in transfer pricing. Excerpts:

The main response to my paper on unitary taxation published last week has been that it would take too long or be impossible to agree. ... Not so.  

.. people have spent too long labouring in the salt mines of the OECD's Transfer Pricing Guidelines: They need to get out and look at the real world.

... The trouble is that the OECD approach starts from the wrong end [by treating offshore subs as independent from their onshore parent companies]. ... A unitary approach would do what any sensible person would, as even the M.P.s on the PAC did, and compare the profits shown in the UK with the share of the companies' worldwide business actually done in the UK. If they are seriously out of line, as they have been shown to be, the UK companies' taxable profits should be adjusted accordingly.

 Sol goes through the history of arms' length and how the world has evolved past the principles.  He concludes that yes, agreeing cooperatively on a measurement and allocation regime will take time, but --

In the meantime, tax authorities could use the weapons already at their disposal much more vigorously. ...Perhaps now that they all are beginning to understand that public opinion will no longer find this acceptable, they will see the need for a new approach.

More at the link.

UK PAC vs Starbucks and HMRC: Driving recursive cycles of change in tax law?

An interesting real time example of the recursive cycle of lawmaking, as described e.g. here by Halliday and Carruthers, is unfolding in the ongoing drama of the UK Public Accounts Committee's hearings on tax avoidance by Google, Starbucks, and Amazon. Richard Murphy has posted a press release issued by the PAC today in which they hit a lot of core tax policy notes: what "fairness" requires in taxation, the duty of taxpayers to the state, the state's duty toward taxpayers as a group, the problem of taxpayer morale when perceptions of unfairness abound, the role of morality in taxation.

But it also draws a picture of contestation in both the domestic and the global lawmaking spheres, drawing in ideas about and challenges to the rule of law, standards, and norms, and involving legal and nonlegal actors. Halliday & Carruthers point to four mechanisms that drive the recursive cycle forward and lead to phases of legal change: the indeterminacy of law, contradictions, diagnostic struggles, and actor mismatch. The press release suggests we have all four of these drivers in play. Excerpts:

"Global companies with huge operations in the UK generating significant amounts of income are getting away with paying little or no corporation tax here. This is outrageous and an insult to British businesses and individuals who pay their fair share. 

...There is little credible information about what is going on. The evidence we took from large corporations was unconvincing and, in some cases, evasive. HMRC also lacked clarity when trying to explain its approach to enforcing the corporation tax regime. The inescapable conclusion is that multinationals are using structures and exploiting current tax legislation to move offshore profits that are clearly generated from economic activity in the UK. HMRC should be challenging this but its response so far to these big businesses and their aggressive tax planning has lacked determination and looks way too lenient. Policing the tax system must be at the heart of what HMRC does.

So we see the PAC taking on a role as a fiduciary for the people and claiming that the state revenue authority has failed in its own duty to act in that capacity: the result has been indeterminacy of law, contradictions and diagnostic struggles as per H&C.

The PAC calls for naming and shaming of "offenders" (difficult when all these companies claim full compliance with all applicable laws), and for transparency and fairness in the administration of the tax regime by HMRC, that "Government has a responsibility to assess and collect tax due from all taxpayers, without fear or favour," and that "[i]f companies do not pay their fair share of tax, other taxpayers have to pay more." As a result, the PAC says "[b]oth HMRC and corporate taxpayers are failing to meet the legitimate public expectations from the tax system."

This essentially frames multinationals as lawbreakers with HMRC in an accomplice role, whether intentionally or out of neglect. The PAC says "it will always be an unequal fight between HMRC and multinational companies," but calls on the revenue authority both to be more agressive in chasing MNCs and to do more to publicly explain why these companies pay so little. We can interpret this to mean that the PAC seeks to involve more public input into this cycle of legal change, i.e., introducing more actor mismatch.

 You can read the rest of the press release at the link above. Will be interesting to see what comes of it, whether the PAC succeeds in driving forward legal change and whether we will be able to identify a beginning and end of a particular recursive cycle of tax lawmaking (H&C say this is generally very difficult to do, since so many variables are involved in legal change). So far on the part of Starbucks, the result seems to be PR/damage control, in the form of public assertions of willingness to pay a bit more. That just underscores the effectively voluntary nature of international taxation when it comes to MNCs--Starbucks is negotiating with the state--and won't address any of the issues raised by the PAC, so the contestation should continue and may bring in more actors and more struggle.

Finnish Tax Research Project?

I am wondering if anyone is working on the corporate tax data published by Finland last month.  I can't read Finnish, so can't make anything of the charts or pdfs, but I assume someone somewhere is gleefully playing with this new data source--I think the first of its kind in all the world. If you're working on it, please contact me, I would really like to know about it.