International tax as revealed in SEC filings

I've written before about how opaque international taxation is because most of the law is worked out in ways that are not made visible to the public, namely through non-judicial review of transfer pricing and related disputes among nations.  I've argued for both corporate tax disclosure and publication of competent authority agreements as a remedy to much of this opacity. Tax Analysts' Transfer Pricing Roundup [gated] offers a fascinating window onto this world:

Transfer Pricing Roundup summarizes significant tax disputes that publicly listed firms have disclosed to regulatory authorities. The regular monitoring of these disclosures sheds light on the friction points within the U.S. system of transfer pricing enforcement. Many of the disputes profiled here involve adjustments resulting from controversial cost-sharing arrangements.

Some of the highlights:

• Accenture PLC, a global management consulting, technology services, and outsourcing company, reported its unrecognized tax benefits could decrease by $637k or increase by $208k depending on how things go with some settlements, lapses of statutes of limitations [read: if they were going to catch us with our fingers in a cooky jar, it's about to be too late] and other adjustments relating mostly to transfer pricing matters 
• Amazon is disputing transfer pricing adjustments in the US that would result in additional tax of $1.5 billion, and in France to the tune of $250 million. 
• Amazon also recorded reserves for tax contingencies of $336M for 2012 and $266M for 2011, to cover transfer pricing, state income tax, and research and development credit positions.
• Cooper Cos. Inc., a medical device company, has $29.5M in "unrecognized tax benefit," $5M of which relate to transfer pricing and other issues "that could significantly change in the next 12 months because of expiring statutes [see above] in unnamed jurisdictions." 
• Dell continues an ongoing battle with the IRS over transfer pricing adjustments dating back to 2004-2006. Dell reports that "An unfavorable outcome in this matter could have a material effect on the company's operations, financial position, and cash flows."
• Microsoft is also involved in a protracted battle with the IRS over transfer pricing involving 2004 to 2006, which could have a "significant impact" on the company's financial statements if it is not resolved in Microsoft's favor. Microsoft does not expect resolution any time soon: must be some thorny issue to work out there. Microsoft's tax contingencies and liabilities are huge: $7.7B and $7.6B as of December 31, 2012, and June 30, 2012, respectively.

Much, much more at the link. Most of these are pharma and software companies--i.e., lots of IP that has been moved offshore and is busy stripping income out of high-tax countries with variations on the dutch sandwich, which looks a little something like this:

Now with Less Fiber!

My feeling is that it is a real shame that most or all of these cases will get settled and eventually quietly erased from balance sheets with little or no explanation and therefore no advancement in the development of international tax law whatsoever, despite all of the resources that will have been sunk into the cause by the private sector and government alike. What a shame.

India revives tax on Vodafone

The headline reads "Government revives Rs 14,000 crore tax demand on Vodafone; company may go for arbitration." Crore = $10 million, so that's 140 billion rupees, which converts to about USD $2.6 billion, up a bit from the original $2.5 billion sought by India's tax authority last year, to account for "delayed payment".

The report says "The company could initiate arbitration before international tribunals under the India-Netherlands Bilateral Investment Protection Agreement"--but this was already done early last year, in anticipation of the reassertion of the tax.  In connection with its filing, Vodafone stated:

"The dispute arises from the retrospective tax legislation proposed by the Indian government which, if enacted, would have serious consequences for a wide range of Indian and international businesses, as well as direct and negative consequences for Vodafone."

I wondered at the time about the oddity that Vodafone could draw India into a dispute resolution with the Netherlands in respect of a law that is not yet passed, but noted that apparently once invoked, the BIT automatically provides for dispute resolution.

The latest is merely an assertion by the Indian tax authority, so it remains to be seen whether Vodafone will seek another victory from the Indian courts (challenging the reassessment) or from the BIT (challenging the retroactive law as a breach of fair & equitable treatment to foreign investors).

Picciotto: States can and should switch to unitary corporate tax

Professor Sol Picciotto has a guest post over at TJN today, in which he talks about the viability of unitary taxation for multinationals and why detractors are too pessimistic because they are too wrapped up in transfer pricing. Excerpts:

The main response to my paper on unitary taxation published last week has been that it would take too long or be impossible to agree. ... Not so.  

.. people have spent too long labouring in the salt mines of the OECD's Transfer Pricing Guidelines: They need to get out and look at the real world.

... The trouble is that the OECD approach starts from the wrong end [by treating offshore subs as independent from their onshore parent companies]. ... A unitary approach would do what any sensible person would, as even the M.P.s on the PAC did, and compare the profits shown in the UK with the share of the companies' worldwide business actually done in the UK. If they are seriously out of line, as they have been shown to be, the UK companies' taxable profits should be adjusted accordingly.

 Sol goes through the history of arms' length and how the world has evolved past the principles.  He concludes that yes, agreeing cooperatively on a measurement and allocation regime will take time, but --

In the meantime, tax authorities could use the weapons already at their disposal much more vigorously. ...Perhaps now that they all are beginning to understand that public opinion will no longer find this acceptable, they will see the need for a new approach.

More at the link.

Canada's decision on Glaxo coming soon!

Prepare yourselves--the Supreme Court will soon release its decision in the Glaxo SmithKline case.  The case record is here.  But as a quick reminder, here are the basics of the dispute:

• Glaxo Group and Glaxo Canada entered into a License Agreement giving Glaxo Canada the right to market Zantac, the active ingredient of which is ranitidine
• The agreement required Glaxo Canada to buy its ranitidine from a member of the Glaxo Group, Adechsa, a nonresident company. 
• Under that supply agreement, Glaxo Canada paid about five times as much per kilo for its ranitidine supply as its generic brand competitors paid for theirs (Glaxo Canada paid between $1,512 and $1,652 per kilo, while two generic brand competitors paid non arms' length suppliers between $194 and $304 per kilo).  
• Even at the inflated price, Glaxo Canada stood to earn a 40% profit margin on the sales of Zantac.
• The Minister deemed Glaxo Canada's purchase price to be greater than that which "would have been reasonable in the circumstances if ... [Adechsa] and ... [Glaxo Canada] had been dealing at arm's length," and therefore reallocated Glaxo Canada's profits under ITA s. 69(2) using $300 as the appropriate price for ranitidine.
• Glaxo Canada argued that any reasonable business person would enter into the supply agreement with Adechsa in order to obtain the benefit of the license agreement with the Glaxo Group.
• The trial judge assessed the license agreement and the supply agreement separately, and upheld the Minister's assessment but allowed an adjustment of $25 per kilogram to reflect the price of processing the ranitidine, therefore setting the arm's length price at $325 per kilo.
• The Federal Court of Appeal decided that the license and supply agreements should have been assessed together and determined that Glaxo Canada’s business circumstances were not comparable with the generic brand competitors because the question at issue was “whether that arm’s length purchaser would be able to sell his Ranitidine under the Zantac trademark." The FCA therefore found that the Tax Court erred in not considering the license agreement as a circumstance, and sent the matter back to trial court to decide whether the price was reasonable under the circumstances (following Gabco).
• On appeal, the SCC is to determine (1) whether the Federal Court of Appeal erred by applying the reasonable business person test to the interpretation of subsection 69(2) of the Income Tax Act; and (2) whether the Federal Court of Appeal erred in interpreting subsection 69(2) by failing to apply the arm’s-length principle on a transaction-by-transaction basis and on the basis that members of the multinational group are operating as separate entities.

My own view is the Gabco reasonable business person test was wrongly applied, and the license and supply agreement must be viewed separately under any coherent transfer pricing assessment, otherwise the taxpayer is free to create any pool of agreements they want to and tie them all together to justify any price--in other words, there would never be any comparables and you might as well not have a transfer pricing regime at all.      But the case deals with repealed s. 69(2) and not the current standard (ITA 247), so even if the SCC rules against the government here and delivers Glaxo a big win by letting it hide royalty payments in its supply agreement, there is likely still a chance that Canada could have a coherent arms' length rule under current law.

Keep in mind that Glaxo settled a similar transfer pricing dispute in the US for $3.4 billion back in 2006 pending a trial that was to begin in 2007; the bulk of the issues in that dispute involved Zantac, but the issue was the deductibility of royalties connected to marketing intangibles rather than the price paid for ranitidine.  The IRS said that GSK conceded over 60% of the total amount at issue in that case.

Sheppard on transfer pricing: clumsy, sorry, and doomed

Lee Sheppard asks Is Transfer Pricing Worth Salvaging, and answers no: it is "the leading edge of what is wrong with international taxation."  She calls transfer pricing a "clumsy tool[] that affluent developed countries have used among themselves, to their collective detriment" and "a sorry vestige of a system that will be gone in 10 years."  She points to a series of factors that will kill transfer pricing as a going concern: resistance from the BRICs, Europe's move to combined reporting with formulary apportionment, social justice activists' increased scrutiny of and scorn for high profile tax dodging, and various prior failures of tax policy that have already allowed multinationals to exit from the tax system on a global basis.  She concludes:

Booking income from an intangible in a tax haven is not a fit subject for tax competition. Tax competition for foreign direct investment is honest competition. Tax competition for booking income is not. Poor little Ireland is still poor, despite the billions of dollars of multinationals’ income booked there. It was only booked there. It sloshed through Ireland on the way to somewhere else, and did not pave the dirt roads on its way out.

HT: TJN, which is hosting a copy of the column on their website.

Transfer pricing: Neither Science nor Law

TJN quotes François Vincent who says transfer pricing is systematically imprecise, not only not an exact science but not a science at all, and moreover, due to its systemic treatment through competent authority decision-making, constitutes "taxation by negotiation rather than taxation by legislation."  The latter is the main argument of my article, How Nations Share, forthcoming (draft here).  Vincent calls the outcome of taxation by negotiation "a secret body of law" but I maintain it is not really "law," at all.   By amalgamating the confidential experiences of the competent authorities of its member countries into "guidelines' and statements on best practices, the OECD functions as an institutional filter between the transfer pricing regime as it actually plays out and public perception about what the law should or does require.  That's no way to make law, but it is remarkably effective at influencing practice.  


Hobbes described "law" as having four core components: it must have certain institutional properties to create binding legal obligations: it must have a known author with recognized lawmaking authority; it must have authentic interpretation; and it must be made known to those subject to it.  (L xxvi. 8-23, 174-81).  The global transfer pricing regime lacks all four components.  That should be very troubling, as I argue in my paper, because it hides a very important legal regime--maybe even the most important tax law regime--from public view.  I am glad to see that people like Mr. Vincent, who know the regime inside and out, are beginning to acknowledge this as a big problem for global tax governance.

The flawed, insensible, unworkable arm's length standard

TJN will host a conference on transfer pricing in Helsinki, June 13-15 2012, to analyse the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and suggest alternatives.  Info here together with a new paper by David Spencer on the subject, "Transfer Pricing: Will the OECD Adjust to Reality?"  Spencer is understandably critical of the OECD arm's length standard:

[An] OECD Staff  Report [published on Oct. 20 2011] defended the OECD’s arm’s length principle described in the OECD’s Transfer  Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and TaxAdministrations of July 2010 (“OECD Guidelines”), in particular for developing countries.  ... The OECD Staff Report ... begins by quoting the OECD Guidelines (paragraphs 1.14-15), that “the arm’s length principle is sound in theory .... The main weakness of the OECD Guidelines is that there is no such “sound theoretical basis.” According to Michael Durst, who from 1994 to 1997 served as Director of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service’s Advanced Pricing Agreement (APA) Program, there is “a gaping conceptual hole at the heart” of the OECD Guidelines....

...Michael Durst has in effect implied that the OECD’s arm’s-length standard exists precisely because it is unenforceable and that is why business lobbyists, in the United States and other countries, have supported it so energetically.

Spencer then documents a litany of criticisms of arm's length by such notables as Martin Sullivan ("The arm’s length method is seriously flawed in both theory and practice"), Reuven Avi-Yonah and Ilan Benshalom (arm's length's "central assumption defies reality, and it is not surprising that a system of
“arm’s length” pricing cannot yield sensible results"), David Rosenbloom ("the arm’s-length system as it operates today [is] fundamentally unworkable"), Stephen Shay ("there is evidence of substantial income shifting through transfer pricing"), and so on.  In conclusion, Spencer asks:

[W]hy should the OECD, a club of 34 rich countries, representing only 18  percent of the number UN member countries, and with a declining share of world trade and investment, be the arbiter, the rule maker, of such a “consistent global transfer  pricing system?” Why should the OECD try to impose its transfer pricing rules on major  developing countries such as Brazil, China and India, and other developing countries?

Professor Mike McIntyre, a vigilant observer of the follies of arm's length and a champion for the viable alternative of combined reporting with formulary apportionment, also responded to the OECD's Oct. 20 report, here, and will present at the TJN conference. He says:

[T]he arm’s-length system promoted by the OECD, after years of tinkering and major reforms has worked poorly or not at all for both developed and developing countries. The great sign of the general failure of the arm’s-length system is that it has permitted multinational enterprises to divert uncounted billions of dollars annually to tax havens.

Prof. McIntyre addresses the various critiques of CR/FA by those who support arm's length (such as the oft-made claim that CR requires a common tax base--no more true than for arm's length), and concludes:

If the goal is simply to eliminate double taxation, then the OECD can claim success. That goal, however, is rather unambitious. A far more worthy goal would be to make multinational enterprises report something close to the income they actually earn in each country in which they operate. The OECD’s arm’s-length approach does not come close to achieving that goal...In contrast, a combined reporting system with formulary apportionment is designed specifically to achieve that goal.

...The arm’s-length method simply is not working, and 50 years of tinkering and major revisions have revealed that it cannot be made to work.  ... Combined reporting remains the best hope of the world for moving past the failed system based on the arm’s-length principle to a system that actually apportions income exclusively to the countries where meaningful economic activity occurs.

It should be an interesting conference.

Murphy on country-by-country reporting

If you're following the corporate tax transparency movement, you'll have heard of Richard Murphy, who takes the credit for creating the concept of country-by-country reporting.  He has a post today on his blog in which he recreates a recent speech explaining the origins and developments of the movement:

When, almost ten years ago I wrote the first ever version of country-by-country reporting in response to one of the first ever questions John Christensen asked of me I thought the entire audience for the idea would amount to just two people – John and Prof Prem Sikka, who had just introduced us. How wrong I was! It seems a good idea has a life all of its own.

...Country-by-country reporting is, and was always intended to be, a full blown and completely new view of the trading of a multinational corporation, ideally required by an International Financial Reporting Standard, but failing that by international regulation. 

What that accounting standard would demand is a full consolidated profit and loss account for each and every jurisdiction in which a multinational company trades.

And when I say full I mean 'full', including sales, costs, an analysis of labour costs and head count and full tax notes – including  a deferred tax analysis.

And in some ways I mean more than full when it comes to this profit and loss account – because country-by-country reporting would also require disclosure of all intra-group sales and purchases, all intra-group hedging and derivative trading and the disclosure of all intra-group financing activity too.

Let's be clear about why country-by-country reporting does this. It's based on a series of solid assumptions. The first is that multinational corporations might act globally but they do not float above the global economy. Their actions are all ultimately geographically located. Country-by-country reporting recognises that. It makes globalisation accountable locally.

Second country-by-country reporting recognises that it is impossible to say that existing accounts for multinational corporations can possibly give a true and fair view of business when up to 60% of world trade – the part that takes place on intra-group basis – is totally lost to view in existing financial statements. It is ludicrous that we don't account for that trade in a globalised world.

More at the link.

Transfer pricing: sketchiest of the sketchy?

Reuters reports on the uncertain tax position (UTP) filing requirement, under which big corporate taxpayers (those with more than $100,000 in assets) must inform the IRS if they are taking a position that they view as "uncertain or vulnerable to challenge."  In other words, if you're taking a position you know is a little bit sketchy or a little bit dodgy, you're obligated to alert the IRS to it.  According to the IRS commissioner, the two biggest disclosure issues are transfer pricing and research & development credits.  Transfer pricing represents 19% of these disclosures:

IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman said at a congressional hearing that, since the beginning of the year, about 1,900 businesses have filed "Schedule UTP" information.

"A lot of the large business issues are international issues - the most serious one is transfer pricing. That's where we're shifting our large business operation," Shulman said.

...This is an area of frequent and intense international tax disputes between businesses and the agency.

Others have suggested that transfer pricing is basically impossible to police; here is a recent take from Brazil.