Here is the only reason why Ted Cruz's citizenship is interesting.

It is not whether he's natural born and therefore eligible for the presidency. It is that Ted Cruz has suggested that he did not even realize he might be a Canadian citizen until the Dallas Morning News suggested it to him and asked a few experts on Canadian citizenship law to confirm that Canada, like the US, like many, many countries, confers birthright citizenship on people born in the territory whether they request it, or want it, or not.

This is interesting because this is all happening during America's ongoing roundup of every person on the planet who may be a US citizen because they were born in the US or by birthright through their lineage, for the purpose of imposing draconian penalties for failure to file tax returns and asset information reports under the US citizenship-based tax regime. This is the only tax regime in the world that treats lineage alone as a justification to impose worldwide taxation. Ted Cruz's expressed thoughtlessness about his own dual citizenship, coupled with his breezy intention to simply get rid of the unwanted extra citizenship, beautifully illustrates the major problem with citizenship-based taxation and why no other country on the planet would try to enforce such a system.

The US is right now imposing enormous penalties and unleashing general chaos on people living in other countries with US citizenship, both by newly enforcing long-ignored rules and by layering on top of these rules a new and more draconian layer of enforcement. The chaos comes in the form of fear-inducing, devilishly complicated and duplicative paperwork, and penalties, most of all penalties, and it is being piled on to millions of people around the world, many of whom, like Cruz, are very possibly only beginning to understanding that citizenship status is mostly conferred upon rather than chosen by individuals.

Ted Cruz should consider himself very lucky, because the citizenship he claims he didn't realize he had doesn't carry any punishment for his failure to recognize it. Moreover renouncing, if he really intends to follow through on that promise, will be relatively simple, cheap, and painless other than the cost to his US political career, if any.

Not so if he had lived his life in Canada with his current apparent dual status. US citizens abroad now understand that discovering ties to the US means discovering a world of obligations and consequences flowing from citizenship that you were expected to know and obey. Ignorance of the law being no excuse, the punishments range from the merely ridiculous--many times any tax that would have ever been due--to the infuriating: life savings wiped out and many future tax savings sponsored by your home government, such as in education or health savings plans, treated as offshore trusts and therefore confiscated by the US. Moreover there is no ready escape hatch for the newly discovered and unwanted US citizenship: five years of full tax reporting compliance must be documented, appointments must be made with officials, fees must be remitted, interviews must be conducted, and in some cases exit taxes must be paid. If some in Congress get their way, renunciation could even mean life-time banishment from the US someday soon.

In the grand scheme of things Ted Cruz's citizenship is a non-story. But for what it illustrates about citizenship-based taxation, it could be the story of the century.

What the banks’ three-year war on Dodd-Frank looks like

A fascinating account from the Sunlight Foundation of the gutting of a regulatory initiative by the kind of methodical persistence that can only be sustained by special interest groups with much to be gained from weak regulation:

In the three years since President Barack Obama signed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, federal regulators charged with implementing it have opened their doors to the biggest banks over and over again – 14 times as frequently as they have to representatives of consumer and pro-financial reform groups, a new Sunlight Foundation analysis finds. 

By most accounts, the banks’ besiege-the-regulators strategy has yielded rich rewards in sapping, slowing, and stymieing regulations intended to prevent another massive financial crisis. The emerging consensus is that Dodd-Frank implementation is limping, while the big banks are poised to return to being the most profitable industry in the U.S.

The website feature an interactive showing the number of meetings by sector over the three years; you can mouse over the dots to see their identities. Is it any surprise that the Giant Vampire Squid is at the top with a whopping 222 meetings, followed closely by JP Morgan with 207? Each of these giants independently dwarfs the entire "pro-reform" group, that tiny cluster of dots on the other end of the graph.

Here's a chart depicting meetings by sector over time:

From the discussion:

In the 152 weeks our data cover, we find 59 weeks in which regulators met with financial sector representatives at least once every single day (Monday through Friday), and 47 weeks in which they met with financial sector representatives at least four times. 

... By contrast, active pro-reform groups appeared in only 153 meetings logs – only about one meeting for every 14 regulators held with financial institutions and associations. Moreover, 24.2 percent of pro-reform group meetings took place on a single issue: the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. 

...Law and lobbying firms, largely working in service of financial institutions, appeared in 707 meetings. Other, non-financial corporate interests, largely energy and agricultural companies, participated in 381 meetings. These companies are major purchasers of derivative contracts, which they use to hedge against price risk.

Imagine you're a regulator. 3,000 meetings with finance industry lobbyists, lawyers, and other corporate interests over three years, each one doing their best to explain why you should undermine the law as written in some tiny way. Would you not want to tear your hair out? Quit in despair? Or just give in to the soothing balm of lobbyist favor? What could possibly be left of the law after this barrage? Meanwhile the anti-regulation crowd has worked very diligently to kill Dodd-Frank's provisions in other ways, such as the lawsuit against the corporate tax transparency provisions sponsored by the American Petroleum Institute.

Sunlight catalogues the delays and dismantling of Dodd Frank that has been accomplished by all this lobbying and litigating and concludes:

...Collectively, the data offer a powerful testament to the oldest and still perhaps most effective technique in the lobbyist’s playbook: sheer persistence. As the Dodd-Frank law passes its third anniversary, lagging on deadlines, and increasingly defanged, the meetings log data offer a compelling reason why: the banks have overwhelmed the regulators. 

Lobbying pays, and it pays whether it is done before, during, or after legislation has been passed. This represents a major governance crisis with no redress anywhere to be found.

Taxcast on unilateral and multilateral approaches to the problem of base erosion

I contributed to this month's Tackle Tax Haven's podcast, together with the very interesting Krishen Mehta, formerly of PWC and now of Asia Initiatives where he works on tax policy issues. This month's topics included the OECD's report on the base erosion project and what countries can do unilaterally while they are waiting (potentially for a very long time) for multilateral change. Have a listen.

TJN on the rule of law and the forthcoming OECD report on base-erosion

The OECD is expected to release its plan to implement its anti-base-erosion project this Friday, and the Tax Justice Network has issued a pre-emptive strike as it were, predicting that the OECD will do very little by way of fundamental reform. Instead, TJN predicts a patchwork of half-hearted measures that will be delivered through the toothless mechanism of non-binding recommendations, instead of a full-throated commitment to real change, which the TJN says would require endorsement of combined reporting & formulary apportionment for multinational companies. I am still not convinced combined reporting is a panacea, but I understand TJN's perspective that arms' length reporting probably isn't capable of delivering the result they seek with respect to taxing the profits of multinationals on a global basis. You can read TJN's whole report here.

But I wanted to note something that particularly struck me in this report, an issue that I worked through at length not too long ago and that has been bothering me for quite a while, and that is the recognition that for the international tax law system to work, we desperately need more transparency regarding what lawmakers actually do when it comes to international tax compliance. Here is what I said on the subject in an article called How Nations Share:

In the case of international income, it is [tax] disputes and their resolutions, and not the law on the books, that constitute the international tax regime. Yet it is all but impossible for citizens to observe exactly how, or how well, their governments navigate this aspect of economic globalization. [Tax treaties] provide only a design for allocating international income among nation states. It is the application of these agreements that determines how revenues are allocated in practice. This application has taken place over the years through hundreds of thousands of interpretive decisions, the vast majority of which are not accessible to the public. Instead, international tax disputes are mostly delegated to institutions that resolve issues in informal, “non-law” ways with minimal public access to the decision-making process and its outcomes. As a result, international tax law in practice features little or no “law.”

In the article, I explained that when actual decisions about the taxation of multinationals are made through processes that lack judicial oversight and feature no public access whatsoever, this creates a huge knowledge gap between the law as written (in legislation and in treaties among other documents) and the law in action (after the competent authorities make their decisions).

The OECD has exploited this gap to its own institutional advantage, by making itself a norm aggregator and filtering mechanism. It thus deliberately creates a non-legal alternative to direct access to legal decision-making. This is a major, even if not well-understood, impediment to the development of law in taxation that has serious consequences precisely because it shields from public scrutiny just how much base erosion is actually going on. We (the public) simply cannot know how big the base erosion problem really is because we cannot access the competent authority decisions that in fact allocate income internationally. The OECD presumably knows the answer but suits its own political and institutional purposes by publishing a highly-processed version of events in the form of reports, guidance, etc.

Because I view this as a major problem for the rule of law which is made ever more serious by being ignored as an issue altogether, I was very gratified to see TJN pick up on the theme and call for publication of competent authority decision-making:

Currently, the MAP [competent authority dispute resolution process] is very secretive, and decisions often involving hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars are not published. The secrecy of both MAP processes and APAs greatly increases the power of frequent actors in these processes, i.e. the international tax and accounting firms – to the great detriment of the system as a whole. Publication of both would be a great step towards a system which could both provide and more importantly be seen to deliver a fair international allocation of tax.

TJN's worries about the repeat-player advantage gained by tax and accounting professionals are well-founded, but I think what is most clearly articulated here is that this is fundamentally a rule of law matter. Moreover, TJN puts this issue third in line in terms of reform priorities but I actually think it is much closer to being at the top of the heap in terms of structures that cause intractable problems for international taxation. I will be very interested to see how the continued pressure TJN has been able to place on OECD decision-making to date plays out on this particular issue.

FATCA delayed again, this time Treasury giving itself 6 months to get the house in order. Lesson: internationalizing a unilateral legal regime is really difficult.

Treasury issued a new Notice 2013-43 today, pushing the withholding deadline to July 1, 2014 (was January 1 2014), the portal opening to August 19, 2013 (was July 15), and the deadline to register as a FFI is now six months from when the portal opens, which I believe would be February 19, 2014 (was October 25, 2013) (but for some reason this date doesn't seem to be indicated in the Notice, instead it says "On or after January 1, 2014, each financial institution will be expected to finalize its registration information by logging into its account on the FATCA registration website, making any necessary additional changes, and submitting the information as final. Consistent with this 6-month extension, the IRS will not issue any GIINs in 2013. Instead it expects to begin issuing GIINs as registrations are finalized in 2014"). Accordingly, no GIINs will be issued in 2013, IRS "expects to begin issuing GIINs as registrations are finalized in 2014," with the first posting of the compliant FFI list by June 2, 2014.

All of this is going to require Treasury to amend the regulations and the model IGAs to adopt these rules, but taxpayers are advised they can rely on the Notice until that happens. Here is the explanation:

Comments have indicated that certain elements of the phased timeline for the implementation of FATCA present practical problems for both U.S. withholding agents and FFIs. In addition, while comments from FFIs overwhelmingly supported the development of IGAs as a solution to the legal conflicts that might otherwise impede compliance with FATCA and as a more effective and efficient way to implement cross-border tax information reporting, some comments noted that, in the short term, continued uncertainty about whether an IGA will be in effect in a particular jurisdiction hinders the ability of FFIs and withholding agents to complete due diligence and other implementation procedures. 

In consideration of these comments, and to allow for a more orderly implementation of FATCA, Treasury and the IRS intend to amend the final regulations to postpone by six months the start of FATCA withholding, and to make corresponding adjustments to various other time frames provided in the final regulations, as described in section III below.

There is also language about jurisdictions that have signed IGAs but have not yet ratified them according to their internal procedures for ratifying international agreements, in line with what the IRS agreed to in the Norway IGA, but notice that there are no hard deadlines here. Instead, FATCA partner jurisdictions get a "reasonable" period of time to get the IGAs through their respective legislative processes. I cannot see how a foreign jurisdiction would have any recourse to an unfavorable IRS determination that its internal ratification period is "unreasonable." I'd say that falls into a rather delicate area of diplomacy: I doubt the IRS will be eager to tell some other country its legislative procedures are too slow, sorry, you're off our whitelist. In any event:

A jurisdiction will be treated as having in effect an IGA if the jurisdiction is listed on the Treasury website as a jurisdiction that is treated as having an IGA in effect. In general, Treasury and the IRS intend to include on this list jurisdictions that have signed but have not yet brought into force an IGA. The list of jurisdictions that are treated as having an IGA in effect is available at the following address: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCAArchive.aspx. 

A financial institution resident in a jurisdiction that is treated as having an IGA in effect will be permitted to register on the FATCA registration website as a registered deemed-compliant FFI (which would include all reporting Model 1 FFIs) or PFFI (which would include all reporting Model 2 FFIs), as applicable. In addition, a financial institution may designate a branch located in such jurisdiction as not a limited branch. 

A jurisdiction may be removed from the list of jurisdictions that are treated as having an IGA in effect if the jurisdiction fails to perform the steps necessary to bring the IGA into force within a reasonable period of time. If a jurisdiction is removed from the list, financial institutions that are residents of that jurisdiction, and branches that are located in that jurisdiction, will no longer be entitled to the status that would be provided under the IGA, and must update their status on the FATCA registration website accordingly. 

More details in the link to the Notice. I have some questions about the various exceptions and wheretofores, including a general sense of confusion about which of the various procedures and penalties starts when, but I'll save these thoughts for another day.

Moral of the story: it's really, really difficult to get an international tax regime going on a unilateral basis. There is a story in this about the difference in making a unilateral rule first, and then repeatedly changing it to fix all the problems that inevitably arise, versus sitting around in international networks trying to make sure the rule will work first, before trying to implement it internationally. Empirical project for international law buffs!

New series of papers on why government can and should bring financial services into the tax base

The Victoria University of Wellington (Australia) has a new SSRN issue of interest, featuring a series of papers by Sybrand van Schalkwyk and the ever-prolific John Prebble, all on the topic of consumption tax and financial services. The first of these is the big picture:

"Value Added Tax and Financial Services"  Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin, Vol. 10, pp. 363-370, 2004 Victoria University of Wellington Legal Research Paper No. 29/2013 Value added tax (VAT) is a relatively modern development. Designers of VAT recognized from the outset that the way in which financial institutions are remunerated creates significant difficulty when the tax is applied to their services. Administrative difficulties relate to imposing invoice-based VAT on service fees charged as part of the margin between buy and sell rates. Theoretical reasons relate to arguments that financial services should not be taxed under a consumption tax because, it is argued, financial services are not consumed in the way in which goods and services are consumed. Because of these difficulties, most jurisdictions have opted to exempt financial services from VAT. However, the commonly accepted reasons to exempt financial services from VAT are not compelling, since financial services are no different in relevant respects from other services. Moreover, there are methods by which financial services could be brought within the VAT base. Furthermore, although exemption is the simplest way for a VAT to treat financial services, it causes significant distortions in the economy.  This paper is of special interest to me because it confirms my own view that societies are increasingly accepting tax systems that intentionally tax the "easy-to-tax" most vigorously, the "hard-to-tax" much less vigorously and more randomly, and the "impossible-to-tax" not at all, and that these categories have been intentionally constructed from regulatory decision-making that renders various activities to a given category in systematic and purposeful ways. There are fundamental justice issues at stake in these regulatory outcomes. If Prebble and van Schalkwyk are correct that exempting financial services from VAT is a policy choice that has been made on the basis of an unexamined theory that these flows are hard or impossible to tax which in turn has been decided because of a failure to institute measures that would make them easy (or at minimum easier) to tax, then the failure to include financial services within existing VAT systems is a grave source of injustice within that tax policy choice (that is, in addition to and apart from the question about whether consumption taxation is itself a violation of justice in the exercise of taxation by states). The papers that follow focus on various ways to increase the coherency of the taxation of financial flows--what I would suggest is an effort to show us that financial flows could in fact be easier to tax, if not "easy-to-tax," given various regulatory reforms: "Defining Interest-Bearing Instruments for the Purposes of Value Added Taxation"   Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin, Vol. 10, pp. 418-426, 2004Victoria University of Wellington Legal Research Paper No. 30/2013  This is the second of a series of four articles on the taxation of financial services under a value added tax. The first article considered whether, from a theoretical viewpoint, financial services should be included under a value added tax. It concluded that the arguments in favour of treating financial services in the same manner as any other service outweighed the arguments against doing so. This second article considers the definition of interest bearing financial instruments in some detail. It also considers the kinds of activities that qualify as financial services in relation to the instruments. The definition of financial services is important where a different type of treatment is applied to financial services. If financial services were taxed like any other service, then no definition would be needed. However, where, as in New Zealand, supplies of financial services can be exempted, the definition of financial services becomes very important. Alternatively, if some financial services are to be zero rated or taxed but not others, then it is necessary to have a global definition of financial services followed by individual definitions of the particular kinds of service that are to be brought within the tax base one way or the other. This article begins by considering interest-bearing instruments.  "Imposing Value Added Tax on Interest-Bearing Instruments and Life Insurance"  Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin, Vol. 10, pp. 471-468, 2004 Victoria University of Wellington Legal Research Paper No. 31/2013  Exemption of financial services from Value Added Tax (VAT) is commonly accepted as being an anomaly in the New Zealand goods and services tax legislation. While exempting financial services from VAT is attractive to the legislature because it is a simple way of addressing the difficulties of applying VAT to financial services, it causes significant distortions, for instance tax cascading, which in turn causes price distortions. The application of VAT to interest-bearing financial instruments and life insurance is complicated by the way in which financial intermediaries charge for these services. The first part of this article investigates how interest-bearing instruments can be taxed under VAT, and the second part how life insurance can be taxed under VAT. There are several options for the treatment of interest-bearing instruments. They can be exempted, zero-rated, or included in the tax base. In this last category, there are three possible methods of including interest-bearing instruments: the invoice, cash flow, and truncated tax flow systems. The last is recommended because policy makers have come to realize that the cash flow system cannot be applied without significant modification.  "Imposing Value Added Tax on the Exchange of Currency"  Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin, Vol. 10, pp. 469-483, 2004 Victoria University of Wellington Legal Research Paper No. 32/2013  Exemption of financial services from Value Added Tax (VAT) is commonly accepted as being an anomaly in the New Zealand goods and services tax legislation. While exempting financial services from VAT is attractive to the legislature because it is a simple way of addressing the difficulties of applying VAT to financial services, it causes significant distortions, such as tax cascading, which in turn causes price distortions. The application of VAT to services that bring about the exchange of currency is one instance where financial services could be included in the VAT base. Services bringing about the exchange of currency are a species of financial service, but are inherently different from other financial services since they are relatively simpler than other financial services. Reasons advanced for exempting financial services in general do not necessarily apply to services bringing about the exchange of currency. Bravo to the authors--this represents a lot of work and adds much to the discussion of how economically-integrated yet politically independent nations can approach the subject of taxation from the perspective that justice matters in policy decisions.

Manal Corwin, now at KPMG, to discuss Reputational Risk Deriving from the Tax Transparency Movement

Fresh out of Treasury, Manal Corwin and some of her new/old colleagues will present a webcast next Tuesday on Tax Transparency and OECD Initiative on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting:

KPMG's Tax Governance Institute will host a webcast that addresses the implications of tax transparency and the potential impact of the OECD initiative on base erosion and profit shifting. Board and audit committee members, CFOs, tax directors and other business professionals interested in attending the program – one in a series of KPMG presentations on this timely topic – can register at: www.taxgovernanceinstitute.com.

The webcast will focus on "the debate over the shift of taxable business income out of the United States and high-tax jurisdictions around the world and into low or no-tax jurisdictions, and the resulting issue of tax base erosion." I'm not sure if debate is the right word there.  Is there a debate about these two phenomena existing as a factual matter? I think no.  Is there a debate about the appropriateness of such shifting and base erosion? I think decidedly yes.

Interestingly, however, KPMG suggests this is a debate about neither the existence nor the appropriateness of profit shifting and base erosion, but rather it is specifically about transparency, namely, the extent to which the public will gain a right to know about the existence and legal sanction of these practices:

The global debate on tax transparency has sparked both public interest and concerns among many companies, and the spotlight will grow brighter in coming weeks as the OECD prepares to deliver its coordinated action plan on base erosion and profit shifting and the European Commission moves forward with announced plans to address issues around tax fairness. With potentially significant changes in future tax obligations and reputational risks at stake, senior executives and board members at multinational companies should find this webcast, and those that will follow, especially useful as they formulate how their organizations should respond to the debate and possible outcomes.

[Emphasis mine.]  This statement is from Brett Weaver, who is described as "tax partner in KPMG's International Corporate Services practice and the firm's partner-in-charge of Tax Transparency" and a member of KPMG's "Tax Transparency Steering Committee," along with Corwin, who is described by KPMG as:

national leader of KPMG's International Corporate Services practice, principal-in-charge of International Tax Policy in the firm's Washington National Tax practice, and former deputy assistant secretary for Tax Policy for International Tax Affairs in the U.S. Treasury Department and U.S. delegate/vice chair to the OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs. 

The other participant on the webcast will be Philip Kermode, "director of the Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union of the European Commission".

It seems very clear to me that the "reputational risk" Weaver identifies is going to be something corporate tax managers and their legal & accounting advisers will be forced to price in going forward. The last paragraph illuminates this:

...the [KPMG] Tax Governance Institute ... provides opportunities for board members, corporate management, stakeholders, government representatives and others to share knowledge regarding the identification, oversight, management, and appropriate disclosure of tax risk.

I think it is safe to attribute the creation of reputational risk (or what some might call an internalizing of a cost that heretofore has been externalized thanks to strong corporate tax confidentiality laws), as well as any potential that may currently exist for systemic change to occur in the OECD's approach to the taxation of multinationals, to the international tax activist movement. As a result this should be a very informative webcast.

New Taxpayer Right in Canada: No Reprisals for "Service" Complaints

From the Canada Revenue Agency website: Harper Government launches new right to ensure Canadian taxpayers are treated fairly [french version here]
The new right says:

16. You have the right to lodge a service complaint and request a formal review without fear of reprisal.   

We know that to be trusted, effective, and efficient, we must conduct ourselves ethically and honestly, and the CRA strives to do so every day. Our employees are expected to act in accordance with the CRA Code of Ethics and Conduct and the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Sector. These codes are terms and conditions of employment and they reinforce our commitment to serve the public with integrity, professionalism, respect, and cooperation. This right means that if you lodge a service complaint and request a formal review of a CRA decision, you can be confident that the CRA will treat you impartially, and that you will receive the benefits, credits, and refunds to which you are entitled, and pay no more and no less than what is required by law. You should not fear reprisal. We are required to apply the law and relevant CRA guidelines and policies, which may include the charging of penalties, or requiring the payment of your debt. When CRA employees act in accordance with the law, these do not constitute acts of reprisal. If you feel that you have been subject to acts of reprisal, the CRA wants to hear from you. We take your concerns seriously. Tell us about them by completing section 3 – Reprisal Complaint on Form RC193, Service‑Related Complaint. We can assure you that we will address your complaint, and that we will send it directly to an investigation office located at CRA Headquarters. This will ensure that the investigation is conducted independently of the office associated with the complaint.

At a meeting with members of Certified General Accountants (CGA) Canada to discuss taxpayer fairness, Minister Gail Shea stated:

“Our Government is committed to ensuring that all Canadians are treated with fairness and respect by the Canada Revenue Agency. In our system of voluntary compliance, taxpayers must have confidence in the objectivity and fairness of CRA’s actions as a tax administrator. This new addition to the Taxpayer Bill of Rights will help reinforce public confidence in Canada’s tax system, and ensure that Canadians taxpayers feel free to speak up if they have a disagreement with the CRA.”

 Curiously, the CRA website adds the following:

Although there is no evidence that Canadians have been subject to reprisal by the CRA, in his work across the country, the Taxpayers’ Ombudsman heard that taxpayers would sometimes hesitate to lodge a complaint for fear of being treated differently afterward. To address this unwarranted fear and encourage Canadians to speak up if they have a disagreement with the CRA, the Ombudsman recommended that a new right be added to ensure Canadians are confident they will be treated fairly. 

The Taxpayer Bill of Rights is an agency statement that lacks the force of law, but many of its rights are legislated (via the Charter or otherwise). This new right aligns with observed attempts by tax agencies to present themselves as "service-oriented," that is, as if taxpayers were customers. It remains to be seen if and how taxpayers will avail themselves of this newly articulated right.

Apple's simple design interface most certainly does not extend to its tax department.

Lee Sheppard has an article today on Apple's tax tricks [gated] where she works through Apple's multinational structure & planning detailes as outlined in the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) report. You should read the whole article, but here are some of its key concepts:

We're ... not easily shocked by transfer pricing practices that the U.S. government accepts, for better or worse. ...But Apple's planning ... is a special case . We're talking gross worldwide revenues the size of the California state budget, and no tax being paid anywhere on a huge chunk of profits. What is truly surprising about the Apple case is its brazenness. PSI concluded that Apple's self-serving intercompany contracts had no effect on its business practices.

...Nearly two-thirds of Apple's revenue comes from foreign sales. According to the PSI report, this foreign income is routed through Ireland and may be taxed nowhere, not even in Ireland. ... 

Apple Operations International (AOI), Apple's Irish-registered holding company, acts as an internal finance company. ... AOI claims tax residence nowhere.

Apple Sales International (ASI), an Irish principal company that manages Apple's supply chain and sales to Europe and Asia, is a subsidiary of Apple Operations Europe (AOE), which is a subsidiary of AOI and has employees and operations. ASI has 250 employees and deals with Apple's third-party Chinese manufacturers. 

ASI claims no tax residence anywhere ... [emphases added].

When I heard these statements--more than once--in the hearings, I wondered why on earth the Senator who was asking at the questions at the time didn't stop right there and say hold on, are you telling us that these companies exist, we are supposed to treat each as a separate taxpayer and respect its independence from the parent company for tax purposes, and accept at the same time that each resides for tax purposes in no country anywhere?

Let's be clear: humans never get away with these kinds of arguments. You might be resident in many places but I think it is very hard to claim that you are resident nowhere--governments always seem to find some reason and some way to claim you. But somehow the Senator didn't challenge this troubling statement.

If the challenge had come, we might have heard a not-so-simple design explanation from Apple, such as that the subsidiaries are incorporated in Ireland, which would make them Irish residents for US tax purposes, but for Irish tax purposes each is resident in Bermuda, while for Bermuda purposes each is resident in Ireland or at least not resident in Bermuda; either way, certainly neither is resident in the United States even though both are clearly controlled from California.

Simple, clean, one button design interface Apple's corporate structure is not.  Funny how Steve Jobs' vision was, and now Tim Cook's vision is, so different for the tax department. Yet this basic structure is, I must hasten to repeat, perfectly, unequivocally legal, understood and accepted and in many ways even facilitated by governments all over the world including and perhaps especially the United States with its deferral regime.  But that doesn't mean the whole structure is similarly straightforward from a legal compliance perspective. More from Lee:

Apple conducts all of its research and development in the United States. Apple Inc., the U.S. parent, has a cost-sharing agreement with AOE and ASI, which pay 60 percent of the cost of this research. Apple's intellectual property is in the United States with the U.S. parent, Apple Inc. Apple told PSI that it divides R&D costs according to worldwide sales revenues.

This arrangement, Lee tells us, dates back to a more permissive time in cost sharing regulatory history and would probably be protected from today's more stringent requirements. Lee observes:

...AOI has no employees; its American board members, who are Apple executives, hold their meetings in California, often without the participation of the lone Irish director. Apple's tax director told PSI that he believed AOI is not managed and controlled in Ireland. Apple told PSI that AOI has not paid income tax to any government for the past five years.

...Ireland takes the position that it is a legitimate low-tax country that only permits the 12.5 percent rate for income from trade, an ancient English concept that appears to require a ruling. Yet Apple told PSI that Ireland permitted an income calculation that enabled Apple subsidiaries to pay Irish corporate income tax at a rate of 2 percent or less. 

Lee wonders if this puts Ireland in a troublesome place vis a vis EU law which prohibits burying state aid within generally applicable tax laws, especially since Ireland is already getting some heat for changing its laws "to accommodate the numerous U.S. multinationals that use it to shelter European sales income." She then works through US domestic tax law and the US-Ireland treaty to show that AOI could very well be viewed as being taxable in the US, yet its income probably wouldn't be subject to tax in any event given the rather complex, internally inconsistent, but overall taxpayer friendly rules of subpart F and its ancillaries.

All in all Lee runs through of some of the more arcane complexities of the US international tax rules in this article, and makes a pretty persuasive case for viewing the system as hopelessly absurd in the extreme.  Tim Cook says he wants to change that, that he's all for a simpler, cleaner interface for the tax code. But remember that very often when someone says they want simplicity, what they really just want is to be able to pay (even) less tax.

New Book: Looking through the Corporate Structure

Saurabh Jain has published Effectiveness of the Beneficial Ownership Test in Conduit Company Cases.  Abstract:

Since the introduction of the term “beneficial owner” to the OECD Model Tax Convention in 1977, courts and the OECD have struggled to interpret the term, and to use it as a test for deciding conduit company cases. 

If applied in a formal legalistic sense, the beneficial ownership test has no effect on conduit companies because companies are legal persons that, in law, own both their assets and their income beneficially. By contrast, in a substantive sense, a company can never own anything because economically a company is no more than a matrix of arrangements that represents individuals who act through it.

Faced with these opposing considerations, courts and the OECD have adopted surrogate tests for the beneficial ownership test. These tests, however, were originally meant to counter different kinds of tax planning strategies. They did not indicate the presence of beneficial ownership. Therefore, they are inappropriate for determining the correct tax treatment of passive income derived by conduit companies. 

This book examines the conflict between the general policy of double tax treaties embodied in the beneficial ownership requirement and the concept of corporations. The work highlights the shortcomings of surrogate tests with the help of analyses of reported conduit company cases. It offers an alternative approach for interpreting and applying the beneficial ownership test. It contains a critique of the work of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs before the insertion of the term, and suggests appropriate amendments to relevant parts of the official Commentary on the OECD Model Tax Convention.

John Prebble alerted me to this book and he says:

The book is particularly timely because it addresses one of  the principal means by which multinational companies siphon profits to low-tax jurisdictions. One apparently obvious way to address the conduit company problem is for states to re-draft and to renegotiate their tax treaties. But that is easier said than done, and usually very time-consuming.

Until there can be wholesale re-drafting of treaties, the book argues persuasively that within current legal frameworks it is not only possible but legally correct for tax administrations and courts to interpret beneficial ownership provisions in tax treaties purposively. The result would be to thwart the use of stepping-stone strategies that shift profits from high-tax countries in Europe, Asia, and the Americas to low-tax jurisdictions.

The book adopts a comparative approach, analysing reported cases from a number of jurisdictions, comparing judgments that have interpreted treaties purposively with formalistic reasoning that creates loopholes that states never intended.

I agree, this is a particularly timely topic. It's technically and conceptually difficult, and it is difficult to solve as a matter of law as well.  The book is available at the link above, and at a 20% discount until May 31 using promotional code EBOT_2013.

Apple in front of the Senate

Apple's on the hot seat and you can still catch it on C-SPAN or follow along with what's happened so far via the WSJ here.

Model Charter of Taxpayer Rights

A consortium of tax advisors has prepared a "Model taxpayer charter to promote greater fairness in taxation across the world".  They have sent copies of this model charter to "Ministers and Deputy Ministers of Finance and Revenue of the countries who participated in the survey alongside the institutions of the European Union, the OECD, the United Nations Fiscal Affairs Committee, the World Bank, the IMF, and other interested stakeholders."

I feel like an interested stakeholder, but it appears that the draft is only available....for sale on amazon....specifically, amazon.uk. That's one very strange way to try to make global tax policy.

If anyone knows anything about this project, I would like to hear more about it.

Why It Would Be Great if Congress Was Forced to Buy Their Own Health Insurance at Full Cost

From FDL, highlights:

Making Congress and their staffers pay the full cost of their insurance is fine with me because that is how the law will treat millions of middle class families. All members of Congress and most staffers will have salaries high enough they would not qualify for subsidies on the exchanges. If Congress is going to make regular people with similar salaries buy insurance out-of-pocket than that should be good enough for Congressional aides.

I also have no problem with the law forcing Congressional staffers to lose their relatively good insurance because that is a long term goal of the law for everyone. The excise tax on “Cadillac coverage” was designed to stop employers from providing good insurance, covering a large share of your premium, and/or getting them to drop offering coverage altogether.  What might happen to Congress is very similar to what Congress intended to happen to others. 

Finally, if Congress is worried their staffers can’t afford to buy insurance out-of-pocket they can just use the money Congress would have spent on their premium and raise their salaries by the corresponding amount. The financing of the law was based on the theory that a dollar in benefits is exactly the same as a dollar in salary. The theory, put forward by Obama’s economists, advisers and the Joint Tax Committee is that if you force companies to offer their employees worse insurance, they will increase their wages by an equal amount. This sounds like a perfect opportunity to put the theory to the test.

Have laws apply to lawmakers the same as it applies to the governed, have the law play out as it was designed, and put the underlying economic theory to the test: these seem like common sense ways to make sure that our democratic decision-making structure is working. Unfortunately we have ample evidence that this structure is working better for lawmakers (and lobbyists) all the time, and correspondingly worse for everyone else.  Congress exempting itself from things that won't personally benefit its members is not a new story, and in light of the brazen roll-back of the "Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act" in order to make it easier for members to quietly line their pockets via insider trading, there is ample reason for pessimism.

Still, WAPO has a story about how Congress isn't really trying to exempt itself, just trying to fix some inadvertent writing in the code that caused some unintended consequence that only a few people understand enough to get upset about. A book could be written on that recurring theme.

US to OECD: target your anti-BEPS regime carefully

This is rich. The US wants the OECD to not go overboard on the BEPS thing.  From Tax Analysts [gated], Treasury International Tax Counsel Danielle Rolfes said that the Treasury wants to

"make sure that any suggested solutions are targeted at addressing the source of the problems and don't go beyond the scope of the BEPS project."

We are talking about a country that can't seem to distinguish between an au pair financing a trip to Europe and a billionaire stashing money in a series of hidden offshore accounts. Yet there's more:

...The BEPS project carries a risk of "scope creep," Rolfes said. ... "We want to stay mindful of what BEPS is and make sure that in trying to solve those problems we don't come up with solutions that are broader than necessary or that have other implications, particularly with respect to the allocation of taxing rights between two taxing jurisdictions," she said.

...While Treasury endorses the sense of urgency around the BEPS project and the feeling that the problems must be fixed, Rolfes said that U.S. officials intend to be thoughtful about how the rules should or should not be changed.  

I'm not sure what is meant by being thoughtful. Being thoughtful might mean thinking through what you need to change, how you mean to change it, how you avoid over-breadth and under-breadth at the same time, how much everyone has to spend in order to get the result you seek, and whether what you write as rules can be coherently implemented in practice.

Perhaps Rolfes is worried that if the OECD looks too closely at the allocation of taxing rights between two taxing jurisdictions, the world will see clearly that (1) the US is the most overreaching in this respect given that it taxes on the basis of citizenship and (2) the global North has long arranged the allocation to favor itself at the expense of the global South.  

Maybe it is just that Rolfes does not appreciate the finger pointing at US companies:

"It's not just U.S. companies that engage in BEPS. Moreover, all agree that the BEPS we are primarily concerned with is driven by tax planning that is perfectly legal."

Rolfes called some of the moralizing on this issue "ironic," though I think she means "hypocritical." It might not not sound right for the Treasury to use that word when talking about tax competition, so maybe this is carefully chosen rhetoric:

Rolfes [added]that while much of BEPS income lands in zero-tax jurisdictions, some of the elements of tax laws that enable BEPS are attributable to tax competition that's occurring between the same taxing jurisdictions that are trying to solve BEPS.

"This tax competition itself contributes to BEPS," she said.

She acknowledges that "many of the current international standards, such as those relating to transfer pricing and tax treaties, have been developed over many years by U.S. tax policymakers working with their counterparts in the OECD."  She says "We at Treasury are humbled ...And we want to make sure that any solutions we have are targeted to that problem and not to other problems."

Treasury economist Michael McDonald added that

The BEPS project should clearly undertake a cost-benefit analysis of the possible alternatives...clearly I think if the BEPS project is going to be successful, one has to weigh the benefits of the current [OECD] Transfer Pricing Guidelines, in addition to the costs."

Tax Analysts economist Martin A. Sullivan can't understand why the US is focused on the BEPS thing at all, since Dave Camp has a proposal for switching the U.S. to a territorial system:

"To me, that seems much more important than an OECD initiative. I don't understand how the two are going to work together. If Chairman Camp achieves his goal by the end of the year of putting the entire international tax system up for a vote, shouldn't that be our starting point?"

Rolfes responded that the BEPS project would still matter even if the US changed to territorial, since such a switch would not in any way make profit shifting less an issue. She also had some interesting things to say about participation and influence in tax policymaking via the OECD:

Treasury needs to be engaged in a significant tax policy initiative like BEPS, which would be undertaken by other countries with or without the U.S. ...Having a seat at the OECD table provides the United States the opportunity to be a part of the dialogue and to have an influence on how international tax rules are developed ... [and] other countries are not going to wait for the conclusion of the U.S. Congress's reform debate.

So the US sees the OECD as playing an important role, and one that could have negative impacts on US policymaking choices absent Treasury's involvement. And this exchange shows that at least some at the Treasury are capable of articulating at least a sense of understanding the concept of regulatory overbreadth. But you could interpret these statements as at best tepid support for the OECD's initiative, at worst a foreshadowing of resistance to come. The US torpedoed the OECD's efforts on harmful tax practices, only to come up with the much more expansive and awe-inspiring FATCA on its own. If the US torpedoes BEPS, what will be in store for the taxation of multinationals? It should be a fascinating ride.

Corruption laid bare by Global Witness: A Manual for Stealing Your State's Resources for Personal Gain

Global Witness issued this must-watch video this week, which demonstrates how leaders steal from their own people with the help of lawyers and bankers. The crime itself is bad enough, but the blasé demeanour of these perpetrators is truly offensive. They must have done this a lot in order to view the proposed transactions in such a banal and relaxed way. Though one woman clutches a pillow quite closely as she calmly explains how to take care of the details. Is she nervous about her illicit behaviour, or just eager to close the deal?

This exposes a number of rotten practices, few of which I would guess are unique to Malaysia. Instead, what I think we are seeing here is a manual:

How to steal your state's resources for personal gain, in 8 easy steps.

Step 1: get control over state land allocation and resource extraction licensing by becoming a state authority.
Step 2: open a series of accounts in trust or corporate form, in places will hide your identity and assets from other state authorities, for example, in "the new Switzerland."
Step 3: have the state sell land at nominal prices to your family members and/or companies you control.
Step 4: when buyers inquire at your state offices about making land leases or purchases, direct them to your family members.
Step 5: have your family members and lawyers explain to the buyer that the purchase will require two purchase contracts plus a side arrangement for licensing rights.
Step 6: write the first purchase contract for a nominal price to legally transfer the property locally but generate minimal (or no) profit.
Step 7: write the second purchase contract to direct the remaining purchase price to be paid directly to one of the offshore accounts.
Step 8: have the buyer write the side arrangement fee directly to one of the offshore accounts.

Query: how do you make sure your buyer actually pays you the second purchase price? That is, if the first contract documents the sale, what stops the buyer exercising ownership rights if he double crosses you on the offshore bank contract? The woman in the video says no problem, this has "been done." How has it been done? Are we talking about hiring thugs to break kneecaps? I've heard of similar triangular contractual arrangements in other equally criminal schemes, and I always wonder about how that aspect works out. Honor among thieves?

IRS brushes aside the constitution to make way for FATCA

In a Tax Notes International article [gated] today, Lee Sheppard discusses remarks about FATCA by Jesse Eggert, Treasury associate international tax counsel, at a March 1 IFA meeting. The most troubling aspect for me comes in the last part, when Sheppard describes a Q&A over the intergovernmental agreements and the IRS rep casually dismisses any constraints on the Treasury's attempt to bind the US with these documents as a matter of international law. There are two main questions here and both answers strike me as deeply problematic. First, there is this:

Can there be an IGA with a country that has no treaty or tax information exchange agreement? Yes, Eggert responded. It would have to be a Model II or nonreciprocal Model I . Amendments would have to be made to add information protections and assistance provisions.

With respect, this does not accord with what we have been given to understand so far about these IGAs. One need only read the preambles to the IGA models and signed agreements and consider the treaty power briefly to see that there is a very large legal difficulty here. As I have said before (and have a feeling I will be saying repeatedly), the Executive Branch cannot simply bind the US to any agreement it wants to without doing violence to a constitutional process that has been expressly laid out and subject to decades of analysis and debate by the country's most preeminent legal minds.

This is why the IRS has been very quietly implying that the IGAs interpret existing treaties. I don't agree on the merits that this could possibly be true, but the IRS needs it to be true because if it is not true, the only alternative is that the IGAs are sole executive agreements entered into by the executive branch with no congressional oversight whatsoever. That puts them on the most precarious legal ground in terms of foreign policy power in the US, and by this statement Eggert pushes them closer in that direction.

Second, there is this:

Does Treasury have authority to make IGAs? Eggert argued that IGAs are within Treasury's statutory authority to make FATCA regulations (section 1471(b)). Treasury and IGA signatories are discussing how to make domestic implementing laws consistent.

Again with all due respect, this just simply is not true as a matter of US law. The executive branch does not have the power to authorize itself to enter into treaties without congressional oversight. It is the constitution that provides the treaty power, and Congress is expressly involved. Congress could have granted the executive specific authority in this case, as it has done in other cases, but it clearly did not do so here. It is not clear what Eggert means by "making domestic implementing laws consistent." Maybe that refers to the domestic laws of treaty partner countries, which will have to change their data privacy laws to accomodate the information sought by the IRS. If so, that has nothing to do with the US. From what we have seen so far, it seems clear that the IRS is treating the IGAs as operational once the other country so indicates it is operational from their perspective (cf Mexico).

Arguing that the authority is implied within Congress' mandate to Treasury to issue regulations under 1471 is blowing a hole through the treaty power. It argues that Congress empowers the Executive Branch with treaty making authority with each and every directive to enact regulations. It makes a farce of the congressional executive agreement process that has been begrudgingly accepted as authentic by most constitutional scholars today. And never mind the old standard, the Article II treaty power. By this logic if the President wants an international agreement--any international agreement of any kind--he never needs to consult the Senate again, he can simply find some reference by the Congress directing his regulators to regulate. If Eggert is right in this assessment, it is not a stretch to see this as the beginning of the end of the Article II treaty ratification process in the United States. In other words if this works, then it's anything goes when it comes to the Executive Branch overriding domestic law with an international agreement.

Finally, I note that one other Q&A Sheppard mentions is also intriguing, though on the surface it seemed uncontroversial:

Existing IGAs will be interpreted to say that countries may choose the definition of an item in the final regulations which came later in time. Treasury will not amend IGAs wholesale when regulations change, Eggert explained.

This may seem benign--it provides flexibility despite the apparently rigid parameters of the documents (which are treaties, after all, and not so easy to just unilaterally alter at whim). But this is in fact very interesting as a legal matter because it quietly moves the world a little closer to yet another US tradition that many people in other countries find odd if not outright incompatible with international law, namely, the treatment of treaties as equal in legal status to other laws, including statutes and case law, so that treaties can be overridden at any time by a new statute or judicial decision. But it goes a further step to include regulations within that overriding scope--where they might not so clearly belong even under US law.

In other words, the IRS is saying that not only does the "last in time" rule apply to IGAs (as they would to any US international agreement), but we'll apply the last in time rule to other countries too (even if under their own laws the treaty would override later-enacted domestic laws); moreover the last-in-time rule is now extended to treasury regulations (a unilateral law that will be used to "interpret" a bilateral agreement, yet another controversial treaty interpretation position), and finally we are going to make it the treaty partner's choice to pick among the regimes to get the best result (which treats treaty partners not as negotiators in a bilateral agreement but rather in the same way as taxpayers subject to an elective regime).

It is getting progressively more difficult to keep up with the sheer volume of violations of laws and norms being undertaken by the IRS in order to get FATCA to work. It is rather disheartening (in the sense of being a scholar who studies legal process as though it matters) to realize that to many or most people involved in this project, all of these violations are just technicalities and semantics getting in the way of a result everyone wants.

Taxpayer morale--a case study in Detroit

Someone could write a PhD dissertation on the fiscal devolution of Detroit and the role of taxpayer morale. Between the below story and the continuing sage of the attempt to make a tax haven out of Belle Island, it would be a fascinating study.

Half of Detroit property owners don't pay taxes:

47 percent of the city's taxable parcels are delinquent on their 2011 bills. Some $246.5 million in taxes and fees went uncollected, about half of which was due Detroit and the rest to other entities, including Wayne County, Detroit Public Schools and the library.

Delinquency is so pervasive that 77 blocks had only one owner who paid taxes last year, The News found. Many of those who don't pay question why they should in a city that struggles to light its streets or keep police on them.

"Why pay taxes?" asked Fred Phillips, who owes more than $2,600 on his home on an east-side block where five owners paid 2011 taxes. "Why should I send them taxes when they aren't supplying services? It is sickening. … Every time I see the tax bill come, I think about the times we called and nobody came."

...Detroit's delinquencies are so pervasive that some owners have been allowed to keep their property even if they don't pay taxes. Wayne County treasury officials are so overwhelmed by foreclosures that they ignored about 40,000 delinquent Detroit properties that should have been seized last year and said they will look the other way on about 36,000 this year.

...Leola Wesley questions what services she gets for her taxes. ...She was the only resident on her 32-parcel block who paid.

"It makes me not want to pay," said Wesley, 85, who would move from her home of more than 20 years if she could afford it. "If nobody else is paying, why should I?"

...In the past five years, the city has lost out on $317 million in taxes, county records show.

"It makes me wonder why I pay my taxes and keep my property up," said Kisner, a North Rosedale Park resident and former top finance official for the city and Detroit Public Schools. "I keep asking myself, 'Am I the stupid one?'"

The billionaires looking to liberate Belle Island don't want any part of this problem, and if they are successful they most certainly won't be any part of its solution.

US tax reform: 11 working groups to watch, but don't get your hopes up

US tax reform is so big and so bad it needs 11 working groups to handle it all!  From the Camp/Levin press release:

Each of the 11 groups will review current law in its designated issue area and then identify, research and compile feedback related to the topic of the working group.  The working groups will be responsible for compiling feedback on its designated topic from: (1) stakeholders, (2) academics and think tanks, (3) practitioners, (4) the general public and (5) colleagues in the House of Representatives.  Once the work of those groups has been completed, the Joint Committee on Taxation will prepare a report for the full Committee, due by April 15, 2013, that describes current law in each issue area and summarizes the other information gathered by the Committee Members.

And the 11 working groups and their chairs (R) and vice-chairs (D) are:

• Charitable/Exempt Organizations--David Reichert (R-WA), John Lewis (D-GA)
• Debt, Equity and Capital--Kenny Marchant (R-TX), Jim McDermott (D-WA)
• Education and Family Benefits--Diane Black (R-TN), Danny Davis (D-IL)
• Energy--Kevin Brady (R-TX), Mike Thompson (D-CA)
• Financial Services--Adrian Smith (R-NE), John Larson (D-CT)
• Income and Tax Distribution--Lynn Jenkins (R-KS), Joseph Crowley (D-NY)
• International--Devin Nunes (R-CA), Earl Blumenauer (D-OR)
• Manufacturing--Jim Gerlach (R-PA), Linda Sanchez (D-CA)
• Pensions/Retirement--Pat Tiberi (R-OH), Ron Kind (D-WI)
• Real Estate--Sam Johnson (R-TX), Bill Pascrell, Jr. (D-NJ)
• Small Business/Pass Throughs--Vern Buchanan (R-FL), Allyson Schwartz (D-PA)

I will try to keep tabs on International, but Financial Services will inevitably veer toward international as will many of the other groups. Income and Tax Distribution really ought to be international in scope too but probably won't be. I don't know either Devin Nunes or Earl Blumenauer but a quick look at both gives no reason to be optimistic that anything like comprehensive reform will come out of this working group. Let's take a quick look:

Devin Nunes is a Tea Party darling, new to Ways & Means, looks like an energy and national security guy all the way, but background and education in agriculture. As to tax, pretty quiet until he signed on as co-sponsor to Paul Ryan's H.R. 4529, "A Roadmap for America's Future", which is all about cutting medicare and social security, and now he's promoting his "American Business Competitiveness (ABC) Act", which apparently would abolish corporate tax all together and maybe advocate for a consumption tax instead.  I think we can see which way he's going to go in this working group. Let's look for him to use the words "competition" and "freedom" and maybe "fair" or "level playing field" a lot and therefore to push for less taxation on multinationals in general (if he can't get rid of it all together) and to be against anything like unitary taxation (formulary apportionment) or corporate tax transparency, the two pillars that would be central to any comprehensive tax reform in the US or really anywhere.  On the other hand, he does seem to favor transparency sometimes [don't miss the impressive list of supporters].  So surprise me, Devin! I do love surprises.

How about his vice chair? Earl Blumenauer has been in Congress since 1996, has a law degree (Lewis & Clark 1976), and is certainly from Portland: he's into mass transit, bicycle commuting, various conservation/environmental causes, PBS, and weed. But he's also a free trade guy, supportive of all the FTAs you can throw at him, that's earned him some protests from the left. He seems pretty quiet on tax, though in 2012 he started getting vocal about big oil subsidies, the AMT and the Bush tax cuts. It looks to me like the tax issues on his radar are domestic ones, mostly involving saving entitlement programs and increasing progressivity--both are safe, vague ground for democrats. I expect he'll use the word 'fair' a lot, but it won't mean what Nunes means when he says it, and Blumenauer will focus on the distributional impact of any proposed reforms, looking for signs it violates progressivity. But I don't expect him to offer all that much, overall. International tax doesn't seem to be anywhere at all on his list of priorities.

So the working group charged with major overhaul of international tax law in the US will be chaired by one anti-tax tea party young gun, and one seasoned and mild-mannered Portlandia character with his mind on other things.

Should be fun to watch this.

I do love these US Dept of State "Remarks to Global Business Conference"

I have no idea why these remarks ended up in a State Dept email distribution I got today, as they date back to a year ago, but they are fascinating anyway: a speech given by Thomas Nides, Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources, to something referred to only as "Global Business Conference." That's not very specific, but I think you'll agree the remarks tell us a lot about the audience and the speaker (and governance, and the revolving door between business and government, and the role of law and the rule of law, and the stories we tell ourselves about those things, and etc etc). Excerpts of note:

...as Deputy Secretary of State and as a recovering businessman myself, I am delighted to welcome so many of my friends from my past and present lives all in one room.  

...First, why do we, as diplomats, care about economics? The simple answer is that good diplomacy is good economics, and good economics is good for diplomacy.

A reminder: what's good for GM is good for America. 

America's global leadership and our economic strength at home are fundamentally a package deal, and we need to shore up both of them. We live in an era where the size of a country's economy is every bit as important to exercising global leadership as its size of its military.

Was that ever not the case? It takes big money to build a big army and supply it with big guns.

The reach of our corporations extend far beyond where even our most aggressive diplomats and development workers hope to go. And, closer to home, America's people are hungry for economic recovery. In a global economy, there's no such thing as a purely domestic recovery. That means the State Department, which manages our relationships around the world, is essential to exercising our economic influence, keeping America prosperous, and creating jobs here at home. 

Second, why did we invite you? Because we believe that building sustainable global growth and creating jobs at home is fundamentally a joint venture. The private sector innovates and allocates capital, and delivers remarkable products and services. And the government opens new markets and ensures the rules are fair. At a time when competition is fierce and jobs are still too far scarce, we in diplomacy and business have to bring our partnership to the next level. 

You innovate, we make things fair, everybody's happy, to a whole nother level indeed. So, who got invited, who is in the room? Why, it's "Business leaders from across American industry, from large companies to small ones ... as well as organizations working to promote American business and fair competition, including my old friend, Tom Donohue." Don't know who that is? Read Matt Stoller's take from several years ago, it's important. And with whom will these business leaders be networking in the halls between remarks lauding their innovation and sheer excellence in creating jobs in America? "Vice President Biden, Commerce Secretary Bryson, our Trade Ambassador Ron Kirk, and the heads of Ex-Im, TDA, and OPIC and Secretary Clinton." And yet there's more, so much more to come.

Which brings me to my third question: What do we, as the State Department, bring to the table? I would submit that the answer is: a huge amount. We are the face of the United States in over 190 countries and at 274 posts around the world. We fight for your rights.

I know you want to add "to party" and I think overall, you'd be right to add it there.

...Over the past 60 years, we have helped establish the rules and institutions to safeguard healthy economic competition and spur unprecedented global growth.

Yikes. Just, yikes. But then there is this absolute gem:

...We have over 1,000 State Department economic officers around the world who wake up each day and ask themselves how they can help American companies large and small compete, connect, and win. From bilateral trade and investment treaties to open skies agreements, we open markets for your companies. We advocate on behalf of U.S. companies exporting to just about every country in the world. We make it a priority to help American companies take part in the growth unfolding across the developing world.  

...And whenever we have seen barriers to open and free and fair and transparent competition, our embassies around the world push back. We push back against unfair barriers to investment. We push back to protect intellectual property, to protest discrimination against our companies, and to guarantee that all companies get a fair shake, whether the owners sit in corporate boardrooms or government ministries. When American businesses are not fairly treated, that's not just an economic issue; it's also a diplomatic issue. 

And let me be clear. We just don't seek a fair shake for American companies; we seek a fair shake for all companies. ... We know that when the competition is open and free and transparent and fair to all people, American companies have what it takes to compete. And we know the same values that help our companies will also help local entrepreneurs, foreign businesses, and ultimately everyone for one simple reason: They create economic growth that improves lives.

Yeah!  That's how winning is done!  Don't forget to visit your mother.  Really, I just had no idea that the State Department had a pep squad of 1,000 "economic officers" [what is that? ah, negotiators of fair competition, economics knowledge helpful but not required] all over the world who woke up every day asking themselves those questions and then answering them. That really is remarkable.

Fourth and finally, what do we hope to accomplish here together? We want to hear from you. We want to know your concerns, where you see opportunities, where you see gaps in our work. We also want you to know that you can turn to us for support. 

...We at the State Department want to help create the conditions that will empower American businesses to get out there and take the risks that will drive a recovery around the world. ... The idea that business, on the one hand, and government, on the other hand, can simply operate in parallel worlds just doesn't cut it. We have to work together. That's what this conference is all about, and that's why I'm glad you're here. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

Then he introduces Ron Kirk. I always do enjoy a speech like this, even if I am a year late to the party. Number of times he used the word fair: 11.  The word compete or competition: 8. The word help: 8. The word jobs: 6. The word business: 17. The word lobby: 0.

What an OECD "public briefing" teaches about the rule of law.

The ACA representative who attended the OECD public briefing on FATCA posted a comprehensive description here. The substance of the briefing is important of course and it is well explained in the post, but I note that we can also learn a little more about the OECD and about international tax lawmaking from this participation, and these are things worth noticing for anyone interested in how the rule of law develops in taxation.

• There were no other members of civil society present (non-government, non-business), and there were empty seats, even though Victoria was initially denied entry because space had to be reserved for business interests. So the OECD is still an epistemic community talking with itself. That is important in terms of framing public discourse about what matters and what doesn't for taxation, as well as what questions ought to be answered and what the answers ought to be.
• The issues are all cast as technical compliance ones, as if the politics and policies are all resolved. They are not, but casting things as merely technical in nature makes it easier to turn aspiration into law; it's a common modus operandi for tax regimes, and the OECD has used it consistently over its lifespan.
• Treaty competent authorities will be working out the technical details on how automatic information sharing is going to take place, including registering FFIs and sending info through the IRS portal.  So more and more international tax will get worked out through these obscure, opaque, non-law making diplomatic channels, and there will be less and less law to work with as a result.

These are notable phenomena in the context of simultaneous calls for transparency and accountability in governance, including from the OECD itself.