Jersey to take ball, go home

If the UK won't play nice.  It seems that the island of Jersey is growing weary of political attacks coming from the UK that label Jersey as an unrepentant tax haven. Tax analysts reports [pdf]:

"Jersey Chief Minister Philip Bailhache, in a June 26 interview with the U.K. newspaper The Guardian, said relations between Jersey and the U.K. have been "strained" over the past several years as their interests have diverged, and that Jersey should be ready to escape the "thrall of Whitehall" if necessary."

I am not sure how independence will stop the UK from using Jersey and its fellow channel islands as a shield to deflect attention away from the notorious city of London, prime tax haven territory.  But in the meantime, the plan is to spend money on marketing to work on Jersey's image:

 "Jersey plans to open an office in London with the specific goal of improving the island's tax image among the British public. (Jersey has already opened a similar office, together with Guernsey, in Brussels.) Noting Jersey's many tax information exchange agreements with EU member states and other countries, Bailhache stressed that Jersey does not market itself as a tax haven or a tax avoidance facilitator."

Jersey's $5.1 billion GDP is built on financial services.  From the US CIA World Factbook, 

Jersey's economy is based on international financial services, agriculture, and tourism. In 2005 the finance sector accounted for about 50% of the island's output. ... Tourism accounts for one-quarter of GDP. ... Light taxes and death duties make the island a popular tax haven. Living standards come close to those of the UK.

That Jersey is a tax haven can't seriously be doubted, I don't think.   Of course the same is true for the UK.  Jersey's chief minister says if UK taxpayers do use Jersey to shelter their income, that it is a governance failure on the part of the UK:

"despite the island's efforts to downplay its use for tax avoidance, ... the real issue is why the U.K.'s and other jurisdictions' tax laws are written in such a way that they allow legal avoidance, which is then condemned."

That's true, but unfortunately for Jersey, it's convenient for them to serve as a focal point for anti-austerity and anti-tax dodger anger in the UK. It would be inconvenient to the UK to target the city of London similarly. 


Update: Tax Analysts sent me a link to an ungated pdf, link replaced above.

The private sector really is doing ok, or, why workers collaborate in their own self-destruction

If by private sector you mean US corporations, which are making more profit than ever:

From Business Insider.  But not if by private sector you mean wage earners.  As we know median wages have plunged in the US; this article shows that in addition wages as a percentage of GDP are at an all-time low:

The author comments that "[o]ne reason companies are so profitable is that they're paying employees less than they ever have as a share of GDP. And that, in turn, is one reason the economy is so weak: Those "wages" are other companies' revenue."


The juxtaposition thus paints a zero-sum picture: that as wages fall, corporate profits rise.  We've seen other charts that show corporations and managers claiming most or all productivity gains over the last several decades at least.

Richard Murphy responds: "the reason why we have a crisis is that the wealthiest and companies got too rich whilst most got left behind so the wealthiest and companies lent the rest of us their excess wealth through debt arrangements which people could not repay."

Now consider Yves Smith's post today in response to sociologist Claude Fischer, who asks "Why Don't Americans Take Vacations?" and answers with rugged individualism and something about the American way.  Nonsense, says Yves, the right answer is, because of a systemic and steady diet of anti-labor propaganda.  Yves points us to a related article of interest by Mark Ames from 2006, "We're not going on a summer holiday," which says:

vacation time has been slowly disappearing for American workers ever since the Reagan Revolution, which ushered in a violent shift in corporate culture away from the paternalistic post-New Deal model towards the current stock-price-is-God model. According to Harvard economist Juliet Schor, in the 30 years before Reagan's presidency American workers were getting more and more vacation time; however, in the 1980s, that trend suddenly reversed. By the time Reagan left office, Americans got three and a half fewer days off per year, on average.

Ames says at the same time corporate managers have vastly increased their leisure time and pursuits.  A glance at the FT's How to Spend It can certainly confirm the market for vacation by the ultra-rich.  For Ames the most amazing aspect is that

the designated victims in this drama - America's workers - are such willing collaborators in their own existential demise.

...according to a New York Times article, British workers get more than 50% more paid holiday per year than Americans, while the French and Italians get almost twice what the Americans get. The average American's response is neither admiration nor envy, but rather a kind of sick pride in their own wretchedness, combined with righteous contempt for their European worker counterparts, whom most Americans see as morally degenerate precisely because they have more leisure time, more job security, health benefits and other advantages. 

We have seen a related version of this in the public outrage ginned up over the "generous" health and pension packages of public sector employees that has allowed conservative governors to eviscerate worker's benefits and their rights in the process--c.f. Wisconsin.   A constant stream of propaganda tells us that public sector workers must be stripped of their many unearned and undeserved benefits.  There is no equally powerful alternative stream of propaganda demanding better health and pension benefits for all workers.   There is no alternative stream painting a picture of life as an American worker when wages stabilise to global median levels.  The result seems to perfectly illustrate Ames' willing collaboration in self-destruction.

Transfer pricing: Neither Science nor Law

TJN quotes François Vincent who says transfer pricing is systematically imprecise, not only not an exact science but not a science at all, and moreover, due to its systemic treatment through competent authority decision-making, constitutes "taxation by negotiation rather than taxation by legislation."  The latter is the main argument of my article, How Nations Share, forthcoming (draft here).  Vincent calls the outcome of taxation by negotiation "a secret body of law" but I maintain it is not really "law," at all.   By amalgamating the confidential experiences of the competent authorities of its member countries into "guidelines' and statements on best practices, the OECD functions as an institutional filter between the transfer pricing regime as it actually plays out and public perception about what the law should or does require.  That's no way to make law, but it is remarkably effective at influencing practice.  


Hobbes described "law" as having four core components: it must have certain institutional properties to create binding legal obligations: it must have a known author with recognized lawmaking authority; it must have authentic interpretation; and it must be made known to those subject to it.  (L xxvi. 8-23, 174-81).  The global transfer pricing regime lacks all four components.  That should be very troubling, as I argue in my paper, because it hides a very important legal regime--maybe even the most important tax law regime--from public view.  I am glad to see that people like Mr. Vincent, who know the regime inside and out, are beginning to acknowledge this as a big problem for global tax governance.

Choosing Austerity

Menzie Chinn says the austerity being imposed on Greece, Spain etc is self-defeating, while in the US the states are voluntarily choosing austerity, to their own GDP detriment, in order to reduce the state for political reasons.  More:

...the approach of muddling through, dealing on an ad hoc basis with each crisis with aid conditioned on fiscal consolidation, is not working. It's not working partly because in the demand determined models we teach in intermediate macro work cutting government spending and raising taxes tends to depress output, as highlighted in this post. But when the countries affected are closely linked by trade, then the total effect of the contractionary policies conducted in individual countries results in even greater contraction.

Had these economies been on floating exchange rates, the contractionary effects might have been mitigated by depreciated currencies. But membership in the eurozone meant that shock absorber was gone. That is why the prospect of an expansionary fiscal contraction was never very plausible in the case of the GIIPS. But as long as the rest of the eurozone countries were unwilling to provide substantially more financing or transfers to the GIIPS, these governments had little alternative to fiscal consolidation. That is the fate of many, many countries that have faced IMF stabilization packages in earlier decades.

In contrast, the U.S. has currency flexibility so it can save itself, but the states chose austerity, and Chinn shows this has led to lower GDP growth.  Chinn says:

In contrast to Europe, the choice to slash spending and taxes was unforced. In the absence of tax cuts, spending could have been maintained at higher levels. Furthermore, the Federal government had the resources to further support the state and local governments. 

...Truly, much of the distress at the state and local level is essentially a self-inflicted wound, that allows a push for smaller government to proceed under the guise of austerity. 

Charts and more analysis at the link.

Why don't politicians support public institutions?

Catherine Rampell talks about the vicious cycle that occurs when budget cuts lead to understaffing and inefficiency, which leads to declined trust government institutions, which leads to further cuts. Writing  in response to Tyler Cowan's post on the loss of trust in government, she argues that trying to cut government jobs or government spending will erode public trust further, using the Post Office as a case in point:

Because it is still waiting for Congressional approval to make many of these changes, the Postal Service is cutting costs by reducing staff levels and hours at existing facilities. Reducing costs in the way that’s most politically expedient rather than most efficient and economically sensible means that service will most likely get worse, customers will lose confidence in the agency, market share will fall further and the agency will be forced to make more drastic and possibly inefficient cuts.

Rampell could have looked to the IRS for a similar and I think very troublesome example of this problem.  It seems so perverse to me that politicians can decry and claim to crack down on tax evasion,  while using the next breath to argue that IRS funding should be cut in the name of efficiency in governance.  Tax compliance is a big project and it requires expertise and resources.  Cut those and I think you should expect compliance to fall accordingly.  Less compliance leads to less revenues being collected leads to even more pressure on the budget.   That's a very vicious cycle and moreover it is the fundamental source of all the budget pressure for all the other institutions of government.  But why do politicians let this happen?  Isn't it in their interest to have strong institutions creating virtuous cycles?


From Cowan's post:

 State and local governments are controlled by politicians and, indirectly, by voters. And for better or worse, those voters have lost faith in the social returns of these jobs and our ability to afford them. The voters have responded by looking to cut expenses, and they’ve chosen state and local government employment as a target.

From this we may well extrapolate to the conclusion that politicians undermine government because even though stronger government would be better for politicians as a whole, each individual politician's re-election hinges on satisfying a public that has lost trust in government.

Cowan says all would be well if we could just wait for prices to rise again:

The slow cure for this problem is to allow asset prices, along with perceived wealth and trust, to return to or exceed the previous levels over time. Americans would then spend and invest more money, bolstering both aggregate demand and supply, and in both the private and public sectors. But the process would be cumbersome, partly because trust is more easily destroyed than restored.  

This sounds sort of ridiculous to me as a strategy.  Probably because I am not an economist but I do read children's books and I have heard this story before.

Cowan goes on to talk about the various fixes available to governments, but concludes that basic trust in government needs to be restored before any big policies can be implemented.  I think it's certainly true that lack of trust in government is spurring NGO interest in transparency in tax matters, c.f. the EITI and CBCR movements, UK Uncut's suit against HMRC, Oxfam's suit against the SEC, etc.  I don't see rising prices doing much for the core concerns there.

Why do we subsidize oil & gas?

Easy: because politicians can't get re-elected when fuel prices seem high.  

OECD praises itself via G20 re: progress on tax evasion

The OECD says the G20 reports that "steady progress is being made towards tackling tax evasion more effectively."

I have called the G20 a syndicator of OECD tax views, since the G20 lacks an independent infrastructure in which to form its own positions on tax policy, so when the OECD points to the G20 pointing to success on an OECD initiative, I interpret that as the OECD praising itself.

In this case the praise is out of step with the general sense I have about where things are with tax evasion today.  I don't think there is much evidence at all that the OECD is making progress.  The evidence seems to suggest rather that the best that can be said is that some counties that were viewed as extremely tax-evasion friendly a few years ago may be less so today.  But on the other hand other countries seem to be picking up the slack.  That doesn't seem like progress, that seems like something about deck chairs and a big luxury liner.  Certainly there are no fewer dollars in tax havens, a point that seems to work squarely against any notion of progress against tax evasion.

The OECD says "The Global Forum reports that more than 800 cross-border exchange of information agreements have now been signed," and 35 countries have signed the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.  What can one possibly make of the attempt to use signed agreements as evidence of progress?  It is a very formalistic way of thinking about things.  "The law exists" is not going to convince anyone that people are in fact following the law, whatever the law may be.  Signing an agreement is not exchanging information.  And I am not even sure that exchanging information is evidence of making progress on tax evasion.  The right information has to be exchanged.  It has to be exchanged in a usable way.  And the information recipient has to have the will and the means to use the information for that purpose.   The commentary I read from non-OECD sources suggests that information is not being exchanged regularly and sufficiently to suggest progress is being made.  Nor do other tools in the anti-evasion toolkit seem to come to the rescue: the OECD itself seems a bit stymied on arm's length transfer pricing, another of its prized weapons against tax evasion.

It is the case that only the competent authorities would know for sure what information they are exchanging under tax treaties and whether they are able to use this information to combat tax evasion.  The competent authorities do not publish any kind of information on this particular data point.  Maybe steady progress is being made.  It would be good to have evidence that it was.  But no amount of prying seems to be opening the door to public access.  We could know so much more about whether progress was being made if we could get some transparency on what the competent authorities do.  But there is a lot of resistance to this form of transparency.